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Many complex systems lend themselves to effective modeling described by a net-
work of dynamically interacting agents. Such modeling is prevalent in many application
domains that include climate science, neuroscience, internet-of-things, power grids, and
econometrics. The evolution of these systems is governed by the interdependencies
and interactions between the agents that can contain feedback loops. Identification
of the presence or absence of influence pathways among the agents is of primary im-
portance that enables subsequent analytics in networked systems such as identifying
central agents and clusters, devising control strategies in distributed systems, and re-
source allocation. In most application domains, the nature of the relationships and in-
terdependencies cannot be easily modeled using first principles. Furthermore, in many
such systems, it is not possible to deliberately affect the system, and thus passive or
noninvasive methods are required. The existing methods of network identification do
not account for the common ways through which data gets corrupted. In real-world
systems, sensor readings can be inaccurate, clocks can get out of sync, and messages
can get lost in transmission over a wireless network. The focus of this research is to
incorporate realistic modeling assumptions on data streams and characterize the effects
of data corruption on network identification using passive means.
We show that identifying the structure of networked systems using corrupt mea-
surements results in the inference of spurious links. The effects of data corruption on
network reconstruction are characterized with provable guarantees on the quality of con-
struction with respect to the generative models considered. A wide range of generative
models that underlie the data streams are considered that include static interactions
(Markov random fields), linear time-invariant dynamical systems, and nonlinear dynam-
ical models. We examine both causal and non-causal inference methods. In both cases,
we provide an exact characterization of the location of spurious links. Our results show
that the spurious links are localized to the neighborhood of the corrupted node. All our
solution methodologies utilize only the time-series observations without any knowledge
of the system parameters.
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Our precise characterization of the erroneous links is further exploited when the
network has special structural properties. There are several physical systems, especially
flow-driven systems like power grids, heat transfer networks, and fluid flow networks,
where every dynamic coupling between the agents/nodes is bi-directional. In such sys-
tems, identifying unidirectional links in reconstruction lead to the conclusion that such
links arise from data corruption. We utilize our precise characterization of spurious links
to detect and localize all corrupt nodes in the network. It is imperative that learning
the exact network representation of such systems without spurious links is needed for
performing accurate state estimation, control, and optimization. To this, we developed
methods to remove all spurious links and identify the exact structure of bi-directed
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Models of complex systems as networks of interacting systems are ubiquitous across
many domains such as climate science [1–3], epidemiology [4, 5], neuroscience [6–8],
metabolic pathways [9–11], quantitative finance [12–14], the internet-of-things (IOT)
[15–17] and video streaming [18]. In many of these systems such as brain, communica-
tion network [19] and power grid [20,21] there is a clear physical network of interacting
agents. Other applications such as social networks [22] and quantitative finance are
examples of networks of nonphysical systems. In all the above domain examples, identi-
fication of influence pathways in networked systems is a necessary first step that enables
subsequent analytics such as: identifying important agents and clusters [23,24], devising
control strategies in distributed systems to steer the system toward the desired behav-
ior [25–28] and resource allocation [29, 30]. The need for frameworks for analyzing and
designing networks of dynamical systems has received renewed emphasis fueled by new
technologies and paradigms. For example, in the internet-of-things (IOT) (see [31,32]),
data collected from ubiquitously sensorized devices and/or from many sensors of a sin-
gle large system (such as an aircraft) are processed to glean important insights and
devise control strategies. Here, the data streams being sensed can be dynamically re-




1.2 Challenges in Network Identification
Approaches for network structure identification may employ either active [33] methods,
or passive [34] methods. The active method of network identification involves removal
of nodes in the network, and/or external excitation/injection of signals to evaluate the
effects in the network [35]. However, in scenarios such as the power grid, climate sci-
ence, and financial markets it is impractical, impossible, or impermissible to externally
influence the system. Here, network structure identification must be achieved via non-
invasive or passive means. The passive identification of a network of dynamically related
agents is becoming more viable with sensors and measurements becoming inexpensive
coupled with the ease and capability of communicating and processing information.
In an effective approach, the interconnectivity structure of a complex networked
system is modeled as a graph where nodes represent individual entities and links repre-
sent a notion of coupling or dependence among them. Initial efforts in graphical model
identification are restricted to modeling the interactions between the time-series data as
static relations [36, 37]. Limiting to static-relations are significantly restrictive in net-
works of dynamical systems where at any given time, the present value of an agent may
depend on the past values and the present value of other agents (also including itself)
and often feedback loops of dynamical interactions between the agents are prevalent.
This poses further challenge in establishing guarantees for consistency of the inferred
network structure.
In most applications, a significant challenge is that the measurements of data streams
are plagued by uncertainties [38,39]. Interconnected networked systems are not immune
to asynchronous sensor clocks [40–46]. Other prevalent forms of measurement uncer-
tainties include inaccurate sensor readings caused by measurement noise [47–52], and
messages getting lost due to packet drops [53–57]. Additionally, such measurement
channel uncertainties can be temporally correlated. It is also possible that such forms
of data imperfection can be introduced deliberately; as malicious attacks [58–62]. Here,
distinguishing corrupted data from good data is challenging and often intractable. It is
conceivable that errors in the inferred network structure plague implementation strate-
gies for estimation, control and optimization in networked systems. Thus, for any
framework for the identification of influence pathways it is imperative that the effects
3
of uncertainty in the dynamically related data streams being processed be explicitly
quantified and understood.
1.3 Thesis Contribution
Network identification for dynamical systems is extensively studied. See [35,63–82,82–
93]. Sparsity constrained methods are studied in [63–69], where the sparsity of the
parameter estimates are enforced to reflect the absence of the corresponding edges in
the network. However, this requires the selection of regularization parameter and the
consistency of the structure estimates depends on the chosen parameter. Furthermore,
reconstruction guarantees using uncertain measurements are not addressed. Active
methods of network identification are studied in [35, 70–72]. Here too, the data mea-
surements are assumed to be perfect without any distortions. Passive methods of net-
work reconstruction are extensively studied [73–89, 126]. However, measurement data
uncertainies and their effects on the quality of reconstructed network have not been
addressed. Another theme of research address the question of identifiability [82,90–93],
under what conditions is the network reconstructed from the measured data unique?
Here too, the data-streams are assumed to be perfectly measured without uncertainties
and disturbances.
In summary, though network identification is extensively studied, and despite its
significance, there is a gap in addressing the effects of measurement uncertainties on
network identification. This dissertation tackles the problem of identifying the inter-
connection structure in networks of dynamical systems with corrupted data streams
using passive methods. We show that identifying the structure of networked systems
using corrupt measurements results in the inference of spurious links. We provide a
rigorous characterization on the location of spurious links. The effects of data cor-
ruption on network reconstruction are characterized with provable guarantees on the
quality of construction with respect to the generative models considered. A wide range
of generative models that underlie the data streams are considered that include static
interactions, linear time-invariant (LTI) dynamical systems, and nonlinear dynamical
models. Rigorous data corruption models are developed that cover a broad class of
practically relevant measurement signal disturbances including nonlinear dynamics and
4
temporal correlations. We do not use any information about the system parameters or
inputs, and utilize only the time-series measurements. The specific contributions of the
dissertation are summarized as follows:
 Considering network reconstruction for linear time-invariant systems admitting
non-causal dynamics, we show that the spurious links are characterized by the ap-
pearance of cliques that are localized to the neighborhood of the corrupted node.
We provide a precise characterization of the location and pattern of spurious links
arising due to multiple corrupt nodes. Our results on uncertainty propagation
during network reconstruction can be applied to guide strategic placement of high-
fidelity sensors and network synthesis that are resilient to and minimize the effects
of data corruption. This is significant during planning stage and deployment of
monitoring devices in applications such as power distribution [94], water distri-
bution [95], and structural health monitoring [96, 97], where network topology is
first identified using sensor measurements for detecting faults and outages.
 Next, we focus on networks governed by static interactions and show that spuri-
ous links arising from data corruption is a more general phenomenon. Here, the
interactions though static, admit nonlinear dependencies. The graphical models
describing such networks are called Markov random fields (MRF). MRF framework
is prevalent across several application domains that include gene regulatory net-
works [10,138], social networks [139], statistical physics [140] image processing [98,
141, 142], robotics [99, 143], finance [144], and climate science [3, 145, 146]. Struc-
ture inference of MRF is extensively studied [36, 37, 101, 102, 147–157, 157–173].
However, state-of-the-art methods do do not adequately address how corrupted
observations affect structure inference of MRF (see Section 3.1 for a detailed
overview on related work). We establish the extent of uncertainty propagation of
spurious links in inference of MRF without requiring any structural assumptions
on the underlying graph nor any prior knowledge on the system nor the noise
parameters.
 We provide necessary and sufficient conditions that delineate the effects of data
corruption on the directed network structure inference for nonlinear dynamical
systems. We present a tight characterization for the spurious links that arise due to
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data corruption by determining their location and orientation. The knowledge of
the directionality of spurious effects can lead to a better assessment of the quality
of reconstruction of mutual influences, and can aid elimination of spurious links
using complimentary methods. Furthermore, the knowledge of causal influence
structure is required a priori to perform local module system identification in
networked systems [103–114], where a local part of the network is of interest
and needs to be estimated. Thus, our results serve as a necessary first step in
understanding what part of network reconstruction can be trusted to facilitate
accurate system identification.
 We show that our precise characterization of the spurious links inferred can be
further exploited when the network has special structural properties. There are
several physical systems, especially flow-driven systems like power grid [115–117],
fluid flow [118–121] and heat transfer networks [122–125], where every dynamic
coupling between the agents/nodes is bi-directional. In such systems, identifying
unidirectional links in reconstruction lead to the conclusion that such links arise
from data corruption. Using our precise characterization of spurious links, we
develop a procedure to detect the location of all corrupt nodes in bi-directed
networks.
 Next, we consider bi-directed networks of linear time-invariant dynamical sys-
tems [107, 113, 126–128]. We develop an algorithm to remove all spurious links
and determine the exact network structure of bi-directional linear time-invariant
systems despite of data corruption. This is significant for adopting the errors-in-
variables method [104, 129–132] to perform accurate system identification in net-
worked systems in presence of measurement noise. Errors-in-variables framework
requires the knowledge of exact network topology prior to estimation of transfer
functions. Thus, our results serve as a necessary first step to determine the exact
network topology despite of data corruptions and complimentary methods using
errors-in-variables approach can then be applied to perform system identification.
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1.4 Thesis Outline
 Chapter 2 presents a wide range of perturbation models for signal disturbances
and characterizes the effects of data corruption on network reconstruction for
linear time-invariant systems.
 In Chapter 3, we present the results for inferring spurious links in networks
admitting static and nonlinear dependencies, that is, the time series are modeled
as random variables.
 Chapter 4 considers networks of nonlinear and causal dynamical interactions.
For a more general class of perturbation models, an exact characterization on the
location and orientation of spurious links in the inferred graph is provided.
 The conditional directed information estimator for directed network inference is
developed in Chapter 5. The consistency of the estimator is also discussed here.
 Corruption detection algorithm in networks of bidirectionally coupled nonlinear
dynamic influences is developed in Chapter 6.
 Chapter 7 presents the algorithm to determine the exact network representation
of bi-directional linear time-invariant systems using corrupted data streams.
Chapter 2
Network Structure Identification
in LTI Systems using Corrupt
Data Streams
2.1 Introduction
As mentioned before, the interconnectivity structure of a complex networked system is
effectively modeled as a graph where nodes represent individual entities and links repre-
sent a notion of coupling or dependence among them. In this chapter, we focus on net-
works where every dependence between the agents is governed by linear time-invariant
dynamics. Network identification for linear systems has been extensively studied. Be-
low, we will present an overview of several research themes in linear system network
identification. However, the majority of works assume that the measurements are per-
fect.
2.1.1 Related Work
Identifiability conditions for determining the transfer functions are provided in [82]. It is
shown that a network is identifiable if every node signal is excited by either an external
input or a noise signal that is uncorrelated with the input/noise signals on the other
nodes. The effects of data corruption are not studied in this work.
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For partially observed states, authors in [103] provide necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for generic identifiability of all or a subset of the transfer functions in the network.
Similarly, the notion of global identifiability has been studied in [105]. However, in both
the articles, the topology of the network is assumed to be known a priori. Moreover,
data measurements are assumed to be perfect.
The problem of learning polytree structures has been studied in [80] and [85]. The
authors provide guarantees of a consistent reconstruction. However, the class of network
structures was restricted to trees and the data measurements are assumed to be ideal.
In this work, we make no such assumptions on network structures and we study the
problem when time-series data measurements are imperfect.
Authors in [74] leveraged multivariate Wiener filters to reconstruct the undirected
topology of the generative network model. With assumptions of perfect measurements,
and linear time invariant interactions, it is established that the multivariate Wiener
filter can recover the moral graph. In other words, for each node, its parents, co-
parents and children are detected. Here, even without measurement and communication
uncertainties, spurious influences are detected; however, they remain local and within
one hop of a true interaction. It is imminent and desirable to establish conditions under
which the combination of spurious links from the method of [74] and the effects of data
corruption do not compound so that negative effects remain localized.
The authors in [133], [134] use dynamical structure functions (DSF) for network
reconstruction [135] and consider measurement noise in the network dynamics. The
proposed method first finds optimal DSF for all possible network interconnection struc-
tures and then adopt a model selection procedure to determine the best estimate. The
authors concluded that the presence of noise and non-linearities can even lead to spuri-
ously inferring fully connected network structures. Also, the authors concluded that the
performance of their algorithms degrades as noise and network size increase. However,
a precise characterization of such spurious inferences in structure was not provided.
[76] and [136] identify causal dependencies in network of LTI systems driven by
unknown intrinsic noise inputs. Assuming that the network structure is known, errors-
in-variables framework for system identification with additive sensor noise is studied




In this thesis, our problem of interest is to determine the Boolean structure of a net-
work, that is, identification of presence or absence of links, using passive means from
corrupt data-streams, and characterize the spurious links that can appear due to data-
corruption.
In order to rigorously model data corruption, we present a general class of signal
disturbance models based on randomized state-space systems. This class of disturbances
subsumes many uncertainties that are prevalent in applications. We provide a detailed
description on how the corruption model affects the second order statistics of the data-
streams.
We present the results for inferring the network topology for LTI systems from
corrupt data-streams. Specifically, we identify a set of edges in the network in which
spurious links could potentially appear. The results can be utilized to understand what
part of the reconstruction can be trusted and to allocate sensor resources in order to
minimize the effects of data corruption. This accentuates the pertinence of the methods
for wider class of networks that has feedback loops and allows instantaneous and/or
non-causal dynamic relations.
We start by reviewing earlier work on LTI network identification using power spectra
in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we describe our data corruption models. In Section 2.4,
we characterize the spurious links due to data corruption for LTI systems. Simulation
results are provided in Section 2.5.
Notation
Y denotes a vector with yi being i
th element of Y.
zi[·] denotes a sequence and zi,t denotes zi[t].
‖ · ‖ denotes standard Eucledian norm for vectors.
PX represents the probability density function of a random variable X.
X ⊥ Y denotes that the random variables X and Y are independent.
i→ j indicates an arc or edge from node i to node j in a directed graph.
i− j denotes an undirected edge between nodes i, j in an undirected graph.
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If M(z) is a transfer function matrix, then M(z)∗ = M(z−1)T is the conjugate trans-
pose.
E[·] denotes expectation operator.
RXY (k) := E[X[n+k]Y [n]] is the cross-correlation function of jointly wide-sense station-
ary(WSS) processes X and Y . If Y = X then RXX(k) is called the auto-correlation.
ΦXY (z) := Z(RXY (k)) represents the cross-power spectral density while ΦXX(z) :=
Z(RXX(k)) denotes the power spectral density(PSD) where Z(·) is the Z-transform
operator.
bi represents the i
th element of the canonical basis of Rn.
2.2 Background on LTI Network Identification
This section reviews earlier results on network identification from ideal data streams.
See [74]. Required graph theoretic notions are described in Subsection 2.2.1. The formal
model of networked LTI systems is presented in Subsection 2.2.2. Then, a result on
network identification via power spectra is given in Subsection 2.2.3. In later sections,
we will analyze these results in the case that data has been corrupted.
2.2.1 Graph Theoretic Preliminaries
We will review some terminology from graph theory needed to describe the background
results on LTI identification. For reference, see [36].
Definition 1 (Directed and Undirected Graphs). A directed graph G is a pair (V,A)
where V is a set of vertices or nodes and A is a set of edges given by ordered pairs (i, j)
where i, j ∈ V . If (i, j) ∈ A, then we say that there is an edge from i to j. (V,A) forms
an undirected graph if V is a set of nodes or vertices and A is a set of the un-ordered
pairs {i, j}.
We also denote an undirected edge as i− j.
Definition 2 (Children and Parents). Given a directed graph G = (V,A) and a node
j ∈ V , the children of j are defined as C(j) := {i|j → i ∈ A} and the parents of j as
P(j) := {i|i→ j ∈ A}.
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Definition 3 (Kins). Given a directed graph G = (V,A) and a node j ∈ V , kins of j are
defined as Kj := {i|i 6= j and i ∈ C(j) ∪ P(j) ∪ P(C(j))}. Kins are formed by parents,
children and spouses. A spouse of a node is another node where both nodes have at-least
one common child.
Definition 4 (Moral/Kin Graph). Given a directed graph G = (V,A), its moral-graph
is the undirected graph GM = (V,AM ) where AM := {{i, j}|j ∈ V, i ∈ Kj} .












Figure 2.1: 2.1(a) Directed Graph and 2.1(b) its moral/kin Graph.
2.2.2 Dynamic Influence Model for LTI systems
Here the generative model that is assumed to generate the measured data is described.
Consider N agents that interact over a network. For each agent i, we associate an
observable discrete time sequence yi[·] and a hidden noise sequence ei[·]. The process
ei[·] is considered innate to agent i and thus ei is independent of ej if i 6= j. We assume ei
and yi to be jointly wide-sense stationary stochastic processes. In particular, we assume
they are bounded in a mean-square sense: E[‖ yi[t] ‖2] <∞ and E[‖ ei[t] ‖2] <∞.
Let Y denote the set of all random process {y1, . . . , yN} with a parent set P ′(i)
defined for i = 1, . . . , N. The parent set P ′(i) associated with agent i does not include
i. The process yi depends dynamically on the processes of its parents, yj with j ∈ P ′(i)
through an LTI filter whose impulse response is given by Gij . Therefore, dynamics of
12




(Gij ∗ yj)[t] + ei[t] for i = 1, . . . , N. (2.1)




Gij(z)yj(z) + ei(z) for i = 1, . . . , N. (2.2)
For compact notation, we will often drop the z arguments. Let y = (y1, y2, . . . , yN )
T
and e = (e1, e2, . . . , eN )
T . Then (2.2) is equivalent to
y = G(z)y + e. (2.3)
The diagonal entries Gii(z) are considered to be zero. We refer to (2.3) as the Dynamic
Influence Model (DIM). Here, G is termed as the DIM generative connectivity matrix.
The DIM will be denoted by (G, e).
Remark 1. The process noise in (2.1) can be correlated across time. In that case, ei
is assumed to be represented as the convolution of white noise with a stable LTI filter.
Remark 2. The diagonal entries, Gii(z) are considered to be zero only for simplification
purposes to remove self-dependence in the dynamics. As will be seen later in sub-section
2.2.3, this enables us to consider Wiener filter projection of signal yi on all signals except
yi. Moreover, we can model the self-dependence and include it in the DIM through the
process noise sequence by convolving a zero mean white noise with Gii(z).
We illustrate the notation by an example. Consider a network of five agents whose
node dynamics are given by,
y1 = e1
y2 = G21(z)y1 + e2
y3 = G31(z)y1 + e3
y4 = G42(z)y2 + G43(z)y3 + e4





0 0 0 0 0
G21 0 0 0 0
G31 0 0 0 0
0 G42 G43 0 0
0 0 0 G54 0

.
Definition 5 (Generative Graph). The structural description of (2.3) induces a gen-
erative graph G = (V,A) formed by identifying each vertex vi in V with random process
yi and the set of directed links, A, obtained by introducing a directed link from every
element in the parent set P ′(i) of agent i to i.
Note that we do not show i→ i in the generative graph and neither do we show the
processes ei. The generative graph associated with the examples described in (2.4) is
given by Fig. 2.1 (a).
2.2.3 Identification from Ideal Measurements
The following results are obtained from [74] where the authors have leveraged Wiener
filters for determining generative graphs of a DIM.
Theorem 1. Consider a DIM (G, e) consisting of N nodes with generative graph G. Let
the output of the DIM be given by y = (y1, . . . , yN )
T . Suppose that Sj is the span of all
random variables yk[t], t = . . .− 2,−1, 0, 1, 2 . . . excluding yj. Define the estimate ŷj of





(yj − ŷj)T (yj − ŷj)
]
.





where Wji(z) 6= 0 implies yi ∈ Kyj (equivalently yj ∈ Kyi); that is i is a kin of j.




yj̄ denotes the vector of all processes excluding yj and Φ denotes the power spectral
density. Thus, Theorem 1 implies that we can reconstruct the moral graph of a DIM by
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analyzing the joint power spectral density of the measurements. The following corollary
gives a useful characterization of the inferred kin relationships in terms of the sparsity
pattern of Φ−1yy .
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, let Φyy be the power spectral density
matrix of the vector process y. Then the (j, i) entry of Φ−1yy is non zero implies that i is
a kin of j.
Remark 3. Φ−1yy (i, j) is described by (i, j) entry of (I−G(z))∗Φ−1e (I−G(z)). Specifically,






k G∗kiGkjφ−1ek where k ∈ C(i) ∩ C(j). For i and j
being kins but Φ−1yy (i, j) to be zero, the transfer functions in G must be belong to a set
of measure zero on space of system parameters. For example, system dynamics with
transfer functions being zero or a static system with all noise sequences being identical.
Therefore, except for these restrictive cases, the results in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
are both necessary and sufficient. See [74] for more details.
2.3 Uncertainty Description
Subsection 2.2.3 describes a methodology from [74] for guaranteed kinship reconstruc-
tion based on Wiener filtering. However, the results assume that the signals, yi, are
measured perfectly. This chapter aims to explain what would happen if we attempted
to apply the reconstruction method to data that has been corrupted. We will see that
extra links appear in the reconstruction, and characterize the pattern of spurious links.
Subsection 2.3.1 presents the general class of data corruption models studied for
LTI systems. The modeling framework is sufficiently general to capture a variety of
practically relevant perturbations, such as delays and packet loss. However, we will see
that all of the corruption models have similar effects on the observed power spectra.
Specific examples of perturbation models are described in Subsection 2.3.2.
2.3.1 Random State Space Models
This subsection presents the general class of perturbation models. Consider ith node in a
network and let it’s associated unperturbed time-series be yi. The corrupt data-stream
ui associated with i is considered to follow the stochastic linear system described below:
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xi[t+ 1] = Ai[t]xi[t] +Bi[t]yi[t] + wi[t] (2.6a)
ui[t] = Ci[t]xi[t] +Di[t]yi[t] + vi[t], (2.6b)
where xi denotes hidden states in the stochastic linear system that describes the corrup-





are independent, identically distributed
(IID) and independent of yi[t]. The terms wi[t] and vi[t] are zero-mean IID noise terms











For distinct perturbed nodes, i 6= j, we assume that Mi[], wi[], and vi[] are independent
of Mj [], wj [], and vj [].
Denote the means of the state space matrices by Āi = E[Ai[t]], B̄i = E[Bi[t]],
C̄i = E[Ci[t]], and D̄i = E[Di[t]].





Note that ūi[t] = E[ui[t]|yi] = (hi ? yi)[t].
Theorem 2. Assume that Mi[t] has bounded second moments and for all positive def-
inite matrices Q, the following generalized Lyapunov equation has a unique positive
definite solution, P :
P = E[Ai[t]PAi[t]>] +Q. (2.9)
Define ∆ui[t] := ui[t]− ūi[t]. Then, the signals ui will be wide sense-stationary with
cross-spectra and power spectra of the form:
Φuiui(z) = Hi(z)Φyiyi(z)Hi(z
−1) + θi(z) (2.10a)
Φuiyi(z) = Hi(z)Φyiyi(z) (2.10b)
where, Hi(z) = Z(hi) and θi(z) = Z (R∆ui∆ui [k]).
The proof is given in Appendix A.1.
16
2.3.2 Data Corruption Examples
We will highlight a few corruptions that are practically relevant to exemplify the above
model description. More complex perturbations can be obtained by composing these
models.
Random Delays
Randomized delays can be modeled by
ui[t] = yi[t− d[t]] (2.11)
where d[t] is a random variable. For example, if d[t] ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then randomized delay
model can be represented in state-space form with no additive noise terms and state



















where b1, b2, and b3 are the standard basis vectors of R3.









. The formal description to compute the expression for θi(z) is
discussed in Lemma 7 contained in the Appendix section. Using Lemma 7 we have
that R∆ui∆ui [t] = 0 for t 6= 0 and R∆ui∆ui [0] is given by
Ryiyi [0]− p>

Ryiyi [0] Ryiyi [1] Ryiyi [2]
Ryiyi [−1] Ryiyi [0] Ryiyi [1]
Ryiyi [−2] Ryiyi [−1] Ryiyi [0]
 p. (2.13)
Measurement Noise
White measurement noise can be represented in the form of (2.6) by setting Ci[t] = 0,
Di[t] = 1:
ui[t] = yi[t] + vi[t]. (2.14)
17
Colored measurement noise with rational spectrum arises when Bi[t] = 0, Di[t] = 1, and
the matrices Ai[t] and Ci[t] are constant. More generally, the result of causally filtering
the signal and then adding noise can be modeled by taking all of the matrices in (2.6)
to be constant.





This is an example of data-corruption that is pertinent to cyber-security. Here, the true
data stream yi is completely concealed and a new false data stream vi is introduced.
This is an extreme case of (2.6) in which Ci[t] and Di[t] are zero:
ui[t] = vi[t] (2.15)
Packet Drops
Here the data stream suffers from randomly dropping measurement packets. The cor-
rupted data stream ui is obtained from yi as follows:
ui[t] =
yi[t], with probability piui[t− 1], with probability (1− pi) (2.16)









 with probability pi
1 0
1 0
 with probability 1− pi.
(2.17)
The generalized Lyapunov equation becomes:
P = piP · 0 + (1− pi)P · 1 +Q (2.18)
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which has the solution P = Q/pi. Thus, the conditions for Theorem 2 hold, and so ui










so that Hi(z) =
pi(1−pi)
z−(1−pi) + pi =
pi
1−z−1(1−pi) .
The formal description to compute the expression for θi(z) is discussed in Lemma
7 contained in the Appendix section. The application of methods described in the
Appendix to derive an expression for θi(z) is cumbersome. However, θi(z) can be
calculated directly. Indeed, direct calculation shows that







p2i (1− pi)|t|+k−2jRyy[k] (2.20)
while inductive application of (2.16) shows that





p2i (1− pi)|t|+k−2jRyy[k]. (2.21)
Here, the sum is interpreted as 0 when |t| = 0.
Subtracting (2.20) from (2.21) and taking Z-transforms gives
θi(z) =
(1− pi)2







2.4 Spurious Links for Perturbed LTI systems
The results reviewed from [74] imply that kin relationships could be inferred from the
power spectra of ideal measurements. However, the result of Theorem 2 implies that
common types of data corruption cause perturbations to the power spectrum of the
observations. In this section, we will show how use of the method from [74] on corrupted
data streams leads to the inference of spurious links. In Subsection 2.4.1 we show how
spurious links arise in a simple example. Then in Subsection 2.4.2, we characterize the
pattern of spurious links that could arise due to data corruption.
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1 2 3 4
(a) Perfect Measurements
1 2 3 4
(b) Unreliable Measurements
Figure 2.2: When node 2 has corrupt measurements an external observer might wrongly
infer that the third node is directly influenced by node 1.
2.4.1 Example: Spurious Links due to Data Corruption
Before presenting the general results, an example will be described. Consider the gen-
erative graph of a directed chain in Figure 2.2(a). Suppose the measured data-streams
are denoted by ui for node i where ui = yi for i = 1, 3, 4 (thus no data uncertainty at
nodes 1, 3 and 4) and u2 is related to y2 via the randomized delay model described in
(2.11). In this case, the processes ui are jointly WSS and the PSD of the vector process
u = (u1, · · · , u4)> is related to the PSD of the vector process y via:
Φuu(z) =

1 0 0 0
0 h2(z) 0 0
0 0 1 0






1 0 0 0
0 h2(z
−1) 0 0
0 0 1 0






0 0 0 0
0 θ2(z) 0 0
0 0 0 0





where h2 and θ2 were described in Subsection 2.3.
Note that D = b2θ2bT2 , where b2 =
(
0 1 0 0
)T
. Set Ψ(z) = H(z)Φyy(z)H
∗(z).
It follows from the Woodbury matrix identity [137] that
Φ−1uu (z) = Ψ
−1(z)−Ψ−1(z)b2bT2 Ψ−1(z)∆−1, (2.23)
where ∆ = θ−12 + b
T
2 Ψ
−1(z)b2 is a scalar.
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Corollary 1 implies that the sparsity pattern of Φ−1yy (z) is given by:
Φ−1yy (z) =

∗ ∗ 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ 0
0 ∗ ∗ ∗
0 0 ∗ ∗
 (2.24)
where ∗ indicates a potential non-zero entry.
Since H(z) is diagonal, it follows that Ψ−1(z) and Φ−1yy (z) have the same sparsity











 , Ψ−1(z)b2bT2 Ψ−1(z) =

∗ ∗ ∗ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ 0
∗ ∗ ∗ 0
0 0 0 0
 (2.25)
Combining (2.23)-(2.25), it follows that the Φ−1uu (z) has sparsity pattern given by:
Φ−1uu (z) =

∗ ∗ * 0
∗ ∗ ∗ 0
* ∗ ∗ ∗
0 0 ∗ ∗
 .
The extra filled spot in the inverse power spectral density corresponds to a spurious
link 1−3. See Fig. 2.2. Ideally, when there are no measurement uncertainties, measured
states of nodes 2 and 4 are sufficient to predict the states of node 3. When node 2 is
corrupt, its measurements are unreliable and are not sufficient (together with node 4
measurements) to predict states of 3. In other words, this loss of information will not
be able to explain all correlations among the observed nodes. However, node 1 mea-
surements can yield information on node 2. Hence, node 1 measurements together with
the noisily measured node 2, and node 4 measurements can yield useful information to
predict states of node 3. Similar intuition holds for reasoning why node 3 measurements
are useful for predicting states of node 1 and the presence of link 1− 3. However, given
uncorrupted measurements of node 3 together with node 2 measurements, node 4 mea-
surements do not contain any useful information to predict states of node 1. This is the
intuition behind the absence of link {1, 4}.
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2.4.2 Determining Generative Topology from Corrupted Data Streams
In this subsection, we will generalize the insights from the preceding subsection to
arbitrary DIMs. The following definitions are needed for the development to follow.
Definition 6 (Path and Intermediate nodes). Nodes v1, v2, . . . , vk ∈ V forms a path
from v1 to vk in an undirected graph G = (V,A) if for every i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 we have
vi − vi+1. The nodes v2, v3, . . . , vk−1 are called the intermediate nodes in the path.
Definition 7 (Neighbors N ). Let G = (V,A) be an undirected graph. The neighbor set
of node i is given by N = {j : i− j ∈ A} ∪ {i}.
Definition 8 (Erroneous Links). Let G = (V,A) be an undirected graph. An edge or
arc i− j is called an erroneous link when it does not belong to A where i, j ∈ V .
Definition 9 (Perturbed Graph). Let G = (V,A) be an undirected graph. Suppose
Z ⊂ V is the set of perturbed nodes. Then the perturbed graph of G with respect to set
Z is the graph GZ = (V,AZ) such that i− j ∈ AZ if either i− j ∈ A or there is a path
from i to j in G such that all intermediate nodes are in Z.
Note that if Z ⊂ Ẑ, then AZ ⊂ AẐ .
The following theorem is the main result for LTI identification.
Theorem 3. Consider a DIM (G, e) consisting of N nodes with the moral graph GM =
(V,AM ). Let Z = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} be the set of n perturbed nodes where each perturbation
satisfies (2.10). Then (Φ−1uu (z))pq 6= 0 implies that p and q are neighbors in the perturbed
graph GMZ .
Remark 4. Similar to Remark 3, cases where i and j are kins in the original moral
graph, GM , but Φ−1uu (i, j) is zero are pathological. Φ
−1
uu (i, j) is expressed by terms in
Φ−1yy , Hl(z) and θl(z) where l is a perturbed node. As remarked earlier, the entries in
G(z) and the corruption model described in (2.6) must belong to a set of measure zero
on space of system parameters such that Φ−1uu (i, j) is zero. Therefore, except for these

























Figure 2.3: This figure shows an extreme example of the effect of data corruption of
a single node. 2.3(a) shows the original directed graph. 2.3(b) shows that even if the
leaf is corrupted there are no erroneous links introduced. But if the hub is corrupted as
shown in 2.3(c) then all the nodes become spuriously correlated.
2.5 Results
Power spectrum estimates were computed after 104 simulation time steps. The esti-
mated spectra were then averaged over 100 trials. The red boxes indicate the erroneous
links introduced as a result of the network perturbation in addition to the the links
in the true moral graph as indicated by the black boxes. For both the networks, the
sequences ei are zero mean white Gaussian noise.
2.5.1 Star Topology
The transfer function for each link is z−1.
Corrupted Leaf
The perturbation considered here is the random delay model, (2.11), on node 2:
d2[t] =
3, with probability 0.651, with probability 0.35.
Φ−1uu (z) =
23
15.02 0.14 1.49 1.49 1.50 1.50 1.45
0.14 1.74 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
1.49 0.05 2.36 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
1.49 0.05 0.05 2.35 0.06 0.05 0.06
1.50 0.05 0.06 0.06 2.36 0.05 0.05
1.50 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 2.36 0.05
1.45 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 2.34

As predicted by Theorem 3, perturbation of Node 2 for this architecture does not
introduce any erroneous links. See Figure 2.3(b).
Corrupted Hub
The perturbation considered here is a random delay on the hub node:
d1[t] =
2, with probability 0.754, with probability 0.25.
Theorem 3 predicts that perturbing the central node could introduce erroneous links
between all of the nodes. See Figure 2.3(c).
Φ−1uu (z) =
5.08 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.38
0.40 2.07 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27
0.40 0.27 2.08 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27
0.40 0.27 0.27 2.07 0.27 0.27 0.27
0.39 0.27 0.27 0.27 2.07 0.27 0.27
0.39 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.27 2.08 0.27
0.38 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 2.08

The estimated power spectrum indicates that indeed, spurious links may be pre-
dicted from examination of the power spectrum Φuu. Therefore, to obtain accurate
topology inferences, high fidelity measurements at central nodes would be beneficial.
2.5.2 Chain Topology
The chain topology in Figure 2.4 is considered. The transfer functions are: between
nodes 1 and 2, 1.2 + 0.9z−1, between nodes 2 and 3, 1 + 0.2z−1, between nodes 3 and 4,
1− 0.9z−1 + 0.3z−2 and then for the last link z−1. Figure 2.4 In the simulations, nodes
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2 and 3 are simultaneously corrupted with the random delay models
d2[t] =
1, with probability 0.832, with probability 0.17.
d3[t] =
2, with probability 0.854, with probability 0.15.
Φ−1uu (z) =
4.23 0.54 0.12 0.25 0.05
0.54 1.20 0.16 0.13 0.02
0.12 0.16 1.06 0.12 0.02
0.25 0.13 0.12 2.22 0.90
0.05 0.02 0.02 0.90 1.42

Perturbation of 2 adds a false relationship between 1 and 3. In addition, perturbation
of 3 introduces erroneous relations between the nodes 1 and 4 as well as between 2 and
4. Thus the erroneous relationships could arise between any nodes that are kins of
3 including the already introduced false kins of 3. Despite this cascaded effect the
erroneous links remain local in the sense that the dependency of 5 is unaffected.
1 2 3 4 5
(a) Node 2 Perturbed
1 2 3 4 5
(b) Node 3 Perturbed
1 2 3 4 5
(c) Nodes 2 and 3 Perturbed
Figure 2.4: This figure shows how multiple perturbations can lead to a cascade effect
as predicted by Theorem 3. Here the original moral graph is a chain. 2.4(a) and 2.4(b)
show the erroneous edges that can arise from perturbing a single node. If nodes 2 and
3 are both perturbed, then another erroneous link between 1 and 4 must be added.
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2.5.3 Discussion on Robust Network Synthesis
We saw how measurement disturbances can produce errors in the reconstructed net-
work topology. In particular, the results suggest that the effect of data corruption is
more drastic for some nodes (like the corrupted hub) than for others. Our results on
uncertainty propagation during network reconstruction can be applied to guide strate-
gic placement of high-fidelity sensors and network synthesis that are resilient to and
minimize the effects of data corruption. This is significant during planning stage and
deployment of monitoring devices in applications such as power distribution [94], water
distribution [95], and structural health monitoring [96, 97], where network topology is
first identified using sensor measurements for detecting faults and outages. By strate-
gically placing high fidelity sensors, we can mitigate effects of data corruption. For
example, in the case of the broadcast architecture, Figure 2.3, placing an ideal sensor
at the hub could localize all perturbations.
2.6 Summary
We studied the problem of inferring the network structure of interacting agents from
corrupt data-streams. We described general model of data-corruption that introduces
an additive term in the power spectra and captures a wide class of measurement uncer-
tainties. We then studied inferring topology of a network of LTI systems from corrupt
data-streams. We established that network topology reconstruction from corrupt data
streams can result in erroneous links between the nodes. Particularly, we provided exact
characterization by proving that the erroneous links are localized to the neighborhood
of the perturbed node. Our results show that data corruption gives rise to the appear-
ance of cliques that are localized around the corrupt nodes. The results can be utilized
to understand what part of the reconstruction can be trusted and to allocate sensor






In the previous chapter, we have shown how perturbing time-series data can give rise
to spurious inferences. The analysis focused on network identification for linear time-
invariant systems. In this chapter, we will show that spurious links arising from data
corruption is a more general phenomenon. Specifically, we will show that the exact same
patterns of spurious links from Theorem 3 will arise in a general class of probabilistic
graphical models known as Markov random fields.
Markov random fields (MRFs) can model a variety of distributions, including con-
tinuous and discrete variables. However, our presentation here is restricted to finite-
dimensional random variables with well defined probability mass or density functions.
Thus, while the class is broad, it does not subsume the analysis from Chapter 2, which




Markov random fields framework is prevalent across several application domains that
include gene regulatory networks [10,138], social networks [139], statistical physics [140]
image processing [98, 141, 142], robotics [99, 143], finance [144], and climate science
[3, 145,146].
Network structure inference for generic Markov random fields is extensively studied
[36, 37, 101, 102, 147–157]. They assume that the observed data are clean without any
corruption. No analysis and guarantees of reconstruction are provided when the samples
are corrupted.
Robust estimation of Markov random fields are consdiered in [161–165, 168, 169],
where a fraction of observations are corrupted. Assuming the knowledge of the fraction
of samples being corrupted, sample complexity guarantees to estimate the true structure
with confidence are provided. Similarly, assuming the knowledge of statistics of noise
model corrupting the observations, sample complexity guarantees to estimate the true
structure with confidence are established in [158–160, 166, 167]. Moreover, the analysis
of all these works were restricted to either binary valued or Gaussian distributions. We
make no assumptions on the probability distributions of the observed data nor do we
assume the knowledge of statistics of data corruption model.
Recently, independent of our results, focusing on tree structured Markov random
fields, authors in [170–173] analyze reconstructing network structure from noisy obser-
vations. They are the closest to our work considering estimation of graphical models
using corrupt data without assuming any knowledge of statistics of data corruption
model. However, they consider a special case of our problem setup restricting to tree
structured models and consider only the neighborhood of leaf nodes to be corrupt. We
make no restrictions on the graphical structure and allow multiple corruptions to be
located anywhere in the network.
In summary, though network inference of MRF is extensively studied, the effects of
data corruption on structure inference are not adequately addressed. Our methods and
analysis does not require any structural assumptions on the underlying graph nor any
restriction on the distribution of observations nor any knowledge on the noise models.
We establish the extent of uncertainty propagation of spurious links during structure
inference for generic MRF. We first provide a background on MRF in the following
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Section 3.2. Then, exact characterization on the effects of corrupted observations on
structure inference is presented in Section 3.3 .
3.2 Description of Markov Random Fields
We provide a formal description of Markov Random Fields and discuss how conditional
dependencies among a collection of random variables are encoded by undirected graphs.
Our presentation of Markov random fields and probabilistic dependencies will be closely
related to graph cliques:
Definition 10 (Clique). Given an undirected graph G = (V,A), a clique is a complete
sub-graph formed by a set of vertices b ⊂ V such that for all distinct i, j ∈ b there exists
i− j ∈ A.
As an example of a Markov random field, consider a finite-dimensional version of
the model from (2.4):
y1 = e1
y2 = M21y1 + e2
y3 = M31y1 + e3
y4 = M42y2 +M43y3 + e4





0 0 0 0 0
M21 0 0 0 0
M31 0 0 0 0
0 M42 M43 0 0
0 0 0 M54 0

.
Here, we take ei to be independent Gaussian vectors with mean 0 and covariance Ei.
When only a finite amount of time series data has been collected for the system in (2.4),
the relationship between the data points can be modeled as in (3.1).
Now we will see how the structure of the probabilistic relationships between the
variables, yi are encoded in the corresponding moral graph from Fig. 2.1(b). If y =[




e1 · · · e5
]>




= x>E−1i x. Then direct calculation shows that the density of y factorizes
as


























Note that the exponential factors contain variables {y1, y2, y3}, {y2, y3, y4}, and
{y4, y5}. These variable groupings correspond precisely to the maximal cliques in the
moral graph from Fig. 2.1(b).
As we will discuss below, having a distribution that factorizes with respect to a
graph is a sufficient condition for being a Markov random field. See also [174]. A
generalization of the construction of (3.1) shows that finite collections of time-series
data can always be viewed as Markov random fields.
To formally define Markov random fields, we need some extra notation and termi-
nology. Let Y be a collection of variables, Y = {y1, . . . , y|V |} corresponding to nodes of
a graph, G = (V,A). If S ⊂ V , then we use the notation YS = {yi|i ∈ S}.
1 2 3 4 5
2p 3p
Figure 3.1: Markov random field GJ with perturbed nodes.
Definition 11 (Separation). Suppose G = (V,A) is an undirected graph. Suppose,
a, b, c are disjoint subsets of V . Then, a and b are separated given c if all paths from a
to b must pass through c.
When a and b are separated given c, we write sep(a, b | c).
Definition 12 (Markov random fields). Let Y be a collection of random variables asso-
ciated with the nodes of an undirected graph, G = (V,A). The variables Y are called a
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Markov random field with respect to G if Ya and Yb are conditionally independent given
Yc whenever sep(a, b | c) holds.
A useful sufficient condition for Y to be a Markov random field with respect to G is
for the distribution to factorize into terms corresponding to cliques in the graph. This
condition was used in the example above. See [174] for more details.
Definition 13 (Clique Factorization). Suppose that Q is a collection of subsets of V
such that each q ∈ Q forms clique in G. Let P (Y ) denote the joint probability distribu-
tion of the random variables Y . Then, we say Y factorizes according to G, if for every
q ∈ Q, there exists non-negative functions Ψq that are functions of random variables in
q such that,




3.3 Inferring Erroneous Links
Now we will describe the effects of data-corruption on inferring the undirected graph
structure from measured data. In our work on time-series models, we assumed that indi-
vidual data streams were perturbed independently. Here we will define a natural analog
of independent perturbations for Markov random fields. However, the perturbation
models could be non-linear.
Let Y be a Markov random field that factorizes with respect to a graph G = (V,A).
Let Z ⊂ V be the set of perturbed nodes. For each perturbed node, i ∈ Z, we draw
a new node ip, draw an edge i − ip, and denote the corresponding perturbed variable
by ui. Note that for all i ∈ Z we only observe the perturbed version, ui and not the
original variable yi. The probabilistic relationships between the original variable, yi,
and the perturbed variable, ui, is given by Ψiip(yi, ui) ≥ 0. Let Zp = {ip : i ∈ Z} and
let UZ denote the set of perturbed variables. Then the joint distribution between Y and
UZ can be described as:







Since the node pairs, {i, ip} are cliques, the construction above shows that the joint
variables (Y,UZ) form a Markov random field with respect to G
J = (V ∪Zp, A∪{i− ip :
∀i ∈ Z}). See figure 3.1.
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Due to data corruption, only the variables YZ̄ and UZ are observed, where Z̄ = V \Z.
The next lemma shows that (YZ̄ , UZ) is also a Markov random field, with graph described
by the perturbed graph.
Lemma 1. Let Y be a Markov random field with respect to G = (V,A). Let Z ⊂ V be
a set of perturbed nodes and let Z̄ = V \ Z be the unperturbed nodes. Assume that the
joint distribution of Y and the perturbed variables UZ factorizes as in (3.4). Then the
collection of observed variables (YZ̄ , UZ) factorizes with respect to the perturbed graph
GZ from Definition 9.
In our model, we have assumed that the variables corresponding to corrupted nodes,
yi for i ∈ Z, are hidden. Then Lemma 1 shows that marginalizing out the variables
yi introduces new probabilistic relationships between the neighbors of yi. The new
links between variables are precisely described by the perturbed graph construction of
Theorem 3. Note that any method that attempts to reconstruct the graphical structure
of the Markov random field based only on the observed data that contains corrupt data
will be likely to detect spurious relationships.
Below, we will show that if P (YZ̄ , UZ) is positive everywhere, then the perturbed
graph exactly characterizes the conditional independence of the observed nodes. To
present this strengthened version of Lemma 1, some definitions are required.
Definition 14 (Pairwise Markov property). Suppose G = (V,A) is an undirected graph
whose N nodes represent random variables y1, . . . , yN . Let Y = {y1, . . . , yN}. Pairwise
Markov property associated with G holds, if for any non-adjacent vertices i, j, we have
that sep(i, j|V \ {i, j}) implies that yi and yj are conditionally independent given Y \
{yi, yj}.
As in the discussion of LTI systems, it is convenient to identify the observed but
unperturbed variables YZ̄ with UZ̄ so that the collection of observed variables can be
denoted by U = (UZ̄ , UZ). The following theorem characterizes the effects of data
corruption in inferring structure of Markov random fields.
Theorem 4. Let Y be a set of random variables that factorize according to graph
G = (V,A). Suppose, Z ⊂ V , is a set of perturbed nodes such that the joint distribution
(Y,UZ) factorizes as in (3.4). Let U denote the set of all observed variables and assume
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that P (U) is positive everywhere. Define Uīj̄ := U \ {ui, uj}. Then, i− j is an edge in
the perturbed graph, GZ , if and only if ui is not conditionally independent of uj given
Uīj̄.
The above result concludes that we infer spurious correlations among the observed
data when there is data corruption. As only unreliable data are available, the states
corresponding to ideal measurements are hidden and marginalized. This introduces
spurious probabilistic relationships among the neighbors of the corrupt nodes and thus,
these spurious correlations inferred are localized to the neighborhood of the corrupt
node.
3.4 Summary
We studied the influence of data corruption on Markov random field models. Here, we
found that our characterization of erroneous links for LTI systems from previous chapter
precisely characterized the spurious relationships that can arise in Markov random fields.
Thus, we showed that spurious links arising from data corruption is a more general
phenomenon.
Chapter 4




In this chapter, we switch our attention to networks of nonlinear dynamical interactions
and causal inference methods. In particular, we analyze how spurious probabilistic
connections are inferred in networks of nonlinear dynamical interactions due to data-
corruption. Thus, we will further reinforce that spurious links arising from data cor-
ruption is a more general phenomenon. We begin by presenting an overview of related
work in network identification for nonlinear dynamics and causal inference methods.
4.1.1 Related Work
Authors in [74] leveraged multivariate Wiener filters to reconstruct the undirected graph
of the generative network model. Moreover, assuming that the interaction dynamics are
strictly causal and using multivariate estimation based on a Granger filter, it was shown
that the directed interaction structure can be accurately recovered. However, results




For a network of interacting agents with nonlinear dynamic dependencies and strictly
causal interactions, the authors in [78] proposed the use of directed information to deter-
mine the directed structure of the network. Sufficient conditions to recover the directed
structure are provided. Recently, [175], [176], [177] defined and used information trans-
fer to determine underlying causal interactions in dynamical systems. However, it is
assumed that the data-streams are ideal with no distortions. [76] and [136] identify
causal dependencies in network of LTI systems driven by unknown intrinsic noise in-
puts. However, in this work we consider nonlinear dependencies and study the problem
of network reconstruction from corrupt data-streams.
The authors in [133], [134] use dynamical structure functions (DSF) for network
recosntruction [135] and consider measurement noise and non-linearities in the network
dynamics. The proposed method first finds optimal DSF for all possible Boolean struc-
tures and then adopt a model selection procedure to determine the best estimate. The
authors concluded that the performance of their algorithms degrades as noise, network
size and non-linearities increase. However, a precise characterization of drawing spuri-
ous inferences in structure is not provided. In this work, we provide exact location of
spurious links that arise during directed information-based network reconstruction from
corrupt data-streams.
Despite its significance, little is known on the effects of measurement uncertainties
on network identification. Assuming that the network structure is known, errors-in-
variables framework for system identification with additive sensor noise is studied in
[129], [104]. However, in this work we do not assume that the interaction structure is
known. Recently in [178], the issues of observation noise and undersampling on causal
discovery from time-series data has been addressed. Although authors concluded that
spurious links can be inferred, a rigorous characterization of such links was not proven
nor a generalization of corruption models was provided. In [179] focusing on networks
with LTI interactions, authors provided characterization of the extent of spurious links
that can appear due to data-corruption. However, the analysis is restricted to LTI




In this work, we focus on identifying the Boolean structure of the network using non-
invasive or passive means from corrupt data-streams. We consider networks with nonlin-
ear and strictly causal dynamical interactions. Moreover, the endogenous noise exciting
the system are not measured and hence, we assume a blind approach [85]. General anal-
ysis of network structure employing passive and and blind means with nonlinearities is
challenging. We make an assumption that the endogenous noise affecting one node is
independent of another and thus we deal with target specified network reconstruction.
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions that delineates the effects of data
corruption on the directed network structure inferred using directed information. We
present a tight characterization for the spurious links that arise due to corruption of
data-streams by determining their location and orientation. Often, the knowledge of
influence structure is required a priori to perform system identification in networked
systems [103], [104], [114]. Thus, our results serve as a necessary first step in un-
derstanding what part of network reconstruction can be trusted to facilitate accurate
system identification.
In [180], preliminary results that characterized the spurious links, in the framework of
this work are provided. However, the analysis was limited to dynamical interactions such
that every node was dependent dynamically on the entire history (strict) of its parent
nodes. In this chapter, we consider a general class of non-linear systems by relaxing the
above assumption on dynamics. Moreover, we provide detailed and rigorous proofs to
generalize the results obtained in [180] wherein only a proof sketch was provided. In
addition, we establish convergence results for the estimator that we use to determine
conditional directed information.
We review needed graph theory notions and describe the framework for generative
models in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we provide models to characterize corrup-
tion of data-streams. Directed network structure inference methods and effects of data
corruption are described in Section 4.4.
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Notations
Upper case letter Y denotes a random variable (r.v) while lower case letter y denotes a
realization of r.v Y .
Caligraphic letter Y denotes the alphabet of r.v Y .
y[·] denotes a sequence and y(t) denotes the sequence y[0], y[1], . . . y[t].
PX represents the probability mass function (PMF) of a discrete random variable X or
denotes the probability density function (PDF) of a continuous random variable X.
i− j denotes one of i→ j or j → i.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Graph Theory Definitions
This subsection gives a list of standard terminology from graphical models. It can be
used as a reference for following sections. For further details, see [36].
Definition 15 (Trail/Path). Nodes v1, v2, . . . , vk ∈ V forms a trail or a path in a
directed graph, G, if for every i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 we have vi − vi+1.
Definition 16 (Chain). In a directed graph G, a chain from node vi to node vj com-
prises of a sequence of k nodes such that vi → W1 → · · · → Wk−2 → vj holds in
G.
Definition 17 (Descendants and Ancestors). Suppose there exists a chain from a node
vj to vk in a directed graph, G. Then, vk is called a descendant of node vj and vj is
called an ancestor of vk.
Definition 18 (Collider). A node vk is a collider in a directed graph, G, if there are
two other nodes vi, vj such that vi → vk ← vj holds.
Definition 19 (Active Trail). In a directed graph G, a trail v1− v2− · · · − vn is active
given a set of nodes Z if one of the following statements holds for m ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}
and every triple vm−1 − vm − vm+1 along the trail:
a) If vm is not a collider, then vm /∈ Z.
37
b) If vm is a collider, then vm or one of its descendants is in Z.
See Figure 4.1 for an illustration.
1 2 3 4
(a) Trail connecting 1 and 4 is active
given Z = {}.
1 2 3 4
(b) Trail connecting 1 and 4 is active
given Z = {2}.
Figure 4.1: This figure shows when the trail connecting nodes 1 and 4 is active given
Z.
Definition 20 (d-separation). Let X,Y and Z be a set of nodes in a directed graph, G.
In G, X and Y are d-separated by Z if and only if there is no active trail between any
x ∈ X and any y ∈ Y given Z. It is denoted as d-sep (X,Y | Z).
Definition 21 (Directed Cycle). A directed cycle from a node vi to vi in a directed
graph, G, has the form vi → W1 → · · · → Wk → vi for some set of nodes {Wn}kn=1 in
G.
Definition 22 (Directed Acyclic Graph). A directed graph with no directed cycles is
called a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
Definition 23 (Bayesian Network). Suppose G = (V,A) is a DAG whose N nodes
represent random variables a1, . . . , aN . G is called a Bayesian Network (BN) if for any
three subsets X, Y and Z of V , d-sep(X,Y | Z) implies X is independent of Y given
Z.
Definition 24 (Faithful Bayesian network). Suppose G = (V,A) is a DAG whose N
nodes represent random variables a1, . . . , aN . G is called a Faithful Bayesian network
if for any three subsets X, Y and Z of V , it holds that X and Y are independent given
Z, if and only if d-sep(X,Y | Z) is true.
4.2.2 Generative Model
In this subsection, the generative model that is assumed to generate the measured data
is described. Consider N agents that interact over a network. For each agent i, we
associate a discrete time sequence Yi[·] and a sequence Ei[·]. We consider Ei such that
38
PEi exists if Ei[t] belongs to a continuous alphabet. The process Ei is considered to
be target-specific, that is, Ei is innate to agent i and thus Ei is independent of Ej if
i 6= j. Moreover, Ei is considered to be uncorrelated across time. Let Y denote the set
of all random process {Y1, . . . , YN} with a parent set P ′(i) defined for i = 1, . . . , N. We
consider strictly causal nonlinear dynamical relations. The generative model takes the
form:
Yi[t] = fi






where fi’s can be any nonlinear function such that PYi is well defined if Yi[t] takes values
in a continuous alphabet. fi is a multivariate function that maps the past measurements
of parent nodes of i, {Y (t−1)j : j ∈ P ′(i)}, previous measurements of the node i in Y
(t−1)
i ,
and the present realization of process noise, Ei[t], to the present measurement of agent
i, Yi[t].
For an illustration, consider the dynamics of a generative model described by:
Y1[t] = Y1[t− 1]Y1[t− 2] + E1[t],
Y2[t] = Y1[t− 1] · Y2[t− 1] + E2[t],
Y3[t] = (Y1[t− 1] + Y3[t− 1]) · E3[t],
Y4[t] = Y2[t− 1]2 + Y3[t− 2] + Y4[t− 1] + E4[t],
Y5[t] = Y5[t− 1] · Y4[t− 1] + E5[t].
(4.2)
























(b) DBN G′ for 3 time slices
Figure 4.2: This figure shows (a) generative graph, (b) its associated DBN for 3 time
slices.
4.2.3 Graphical Representation
Here we describe how networks of dynamical systems are represented by graphs.
Generative Graph
The structural description of (4.1) induces a generative graph G = (V,A) formed by
identifying each vertex vi in V with random process Yi and the set of directed links, A,
obtained by introducing a directed link from every element in the parent set P ′(i) of
agent i to i. Note that we do not show i→ i in the generative graph and neither do we
show the processes Ei. The generative graph describes the relationships between the
stochastic processes in Y .
The generative graph associated with the example described in (4.2) is given by Fig.
4.2(a). When the time variable is unraveled we obtain the Dynamic Bayesian Network.
Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN)
Let G = (V,A) be a generative graph. Let Yi be as defined in (4.1) for all i ∈ V . Suppose
all discrete time sequences have a finite horizon assumed to be T . Let Sij [t] = {t′ :
40
Yj [t
′] ∈ Y (t−1)j as an argument of fi in expression of Yi[t] in (4.1)} for all j ∈ P ′(i)∪{i}
















The joint distribution of Y (T ) is given by:






where the parents of Yi[t] are obtained from G
′. It can be shown that G′ is the Bayesian
network for the random variables {Yi[t] : t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T, i = 1, 2, . . . , N} and is
considered the Dynamic Bayesian Network for {Yi : i = 1, 2, . . . , N}(see [36]). Figure
4.2(b) represents the DBN for the system in (4.2) for three time steps.
4.3 Uncertainty Description
In this section we provide a description for how uncertainty affects the time-series Yi. We
interchangeably use corruption or perturbation to denote uncertainties in data-streams.
4.3.1 General Perturbation Models
Consider ith node in a generative graph and it’s associated unperturbed time-series Yi.





i , ζi[t]), (4.4)
where gi can be any multivariate function that maps the present and past values of
uncorrupted data-streams in Y
(t)
i , the present value of an independent random process
ζi[t], and past corrupt measurements in U
(t−1)
i to the current corrupt measurement,
Ui[t], such that PUi exists if Ui[t] takes values in a continuous alphabet. ζi[t] is such
that Pζi exists if ζi[t] belongs to a continuous alphabet, and is independent of Ei, Yi
for all i ∈ 1, · · · , N , and ζj [t] for i 6= j. Note that the above perturbation model
admits nonlinear dependecies and is more general than the corruption models discussed
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in Chapter 2. We highlight a few important perturbation models that are practically
relevant.
Temporal Uncertainty
Consider a node i in a generative graph. Suppose t is the true clock index but the node
i measures a noisy clock index which is given by a random process, ζi[t]. One such
probabilistic model is given by the following IID Bernoulli process:
ζi[t] =
d1, with probability pid2, with probability (1− pi),
where d1 and d2 are any non-positive integers such that at least one of d1 and d2 are
not equal to 0. Randomized delays in information transmission can be modeled as a
convolution operation with the impulse function δ[t] shifted by ζi[t] as :
Ui[t] = δ[t+ ζi[t]] ∗ Yi[t], (4.5)
where,
δ[t] =
1, t = 00, t 6= 0.
Noisy Filtering
Given a node i in a generative graph, the data-stream Yi is causally filtered and cor-
rupted with independent measurement noise ζi[·]. This perturbation model is described
by:
Ui[t] = (Li ∗ Yi)[t] + ζi[t], (4.6)
where Li is a stable causal linear time invariant filter.
Packet Drops
The measurement Ui[t] corresponding to an ideal data-point Yi[t] packet reception at
time t can be stochastically modeled as:
Ui[t] =
Yi[t], with probability piUi[t− 1], with probability (1− pi). (4.7)
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Consider an IID Bernoulli process ζi[t] described by success probability, pi. The cor-
ruption model in (4.4) takes the form:


































Figure 4.3: Figure (a) shows Perturbed DBN G′Z for 3 time slices when node 1 is
corrupt. Node 1 ideal stream denoted by Y1 is shaded because it is not measured.
Figure (b) shows only the measured data-streams and their causal relations.
4.3.2 Perturbed Dynamic Bayesian Network
Here, we provide a discussion on how the dynamic Bayesian network associated with the
measured data-streams gets altered when the data-streams are subject to corruption.
Note that the measured data-streams only includes the corrupted time-series for the
nodes that are corrupted and the data-streams for those nodes that are not corrupted.
The uncorrupted time-series for the corrupted nodes are not measured. When the time
variable is unraveled we obtain the perturbed DBN (PDBN) that depicts the causal
dependencies between the true data-streams for the network, and in addition shows the
dependencies between the uncorrupted measurements and the corrupted values for the
corrupted nodes, and between the corrupted measurements for each corrupted node.
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Thus, the perturbed DBN is the union of DBN and the causal dependencies for the
time-series associated with the corrupted node. Figure 4.3(a) shows an example of a
PDBN corresponding to the generative graph in Fig. 4.2(a) for three time slices. Here,
node 1 data-streams are corrupt following a noisy filtering model described in (4.6).
Consider a generative graph G = (V,A). Let Yi be as defined in (4.1) for all
i ∈ V . Suppose all discrete time sequences have a finite horizon assumed to be T . Let
G′ = (V ′, A′) be the associated dynamic Bayesian network. Suppose Z ⊂ V is the set of
perturbed nodes with perturbation model described in (4.4). For i ∈ Z, the measured
(corrupt) data-stream corresponding to agent i, Ui, is related to Yi via (4.4). Let UZ =
{Ui}i∈Z and YZ̄ = {Yj}j∈Z̄ where Z̄ = V \Z. Due to corruption only UZ and YZ̄ are mea-
sured and observed. Denote the measured data-streams byW = UZ ∪YZ̄ . For all j ∈ Z,
let SUj [t] = {t′ : Uj [t′] ∈ U (t−1)j is an argument of gi in the expression of Uj [t] in (4.4)}
and let SYj [t] = {t′ : Yj [t′] ∈ Y (t)j is an argument of gi in the expression of Uj [t] in (4.4)}
























 for all t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , T}.
Note that the vertex set V ′Z consists of all measurements given by the set W, and the
uncorrupted versions Yk of the corrupted versions Uk for k ∈ Z.
Consider the set of random variables, R = {Yi[t] : i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} and t ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , T}} ∪ {Ui[t] : i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} and t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , T}}. The joint



























Z is the Bayesian Network for
the random variables R and is considered as the perturbed DBN associated with UZ∪Y .
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Remark 5. Above, the discrete time sequences were considered to have finite horizon
only to illustrate DBN and PDBN. The main results in this work characterizing the
structure inference from corrupt data-streams holds for any horizon.
4.4 Structure Identification
4.4.1 Structure Inference from Ideal Data-Streams
First, we recall how the structure of a generative graph can be inferred using directed
information in the case of ideal data-streams. Consider a generative graph G with N
nodes and let Y denote the collection of N data-streams that are measured. The authors
in [78] defined and applied causally conditioned directed information (DI) in a network
of dynamically interacting agents to determine if a process causally influences another.
A slightly modified definition of DI as defined in [78] is:
Definition 25 (Causally Conditioned Directed Information). The causally conditioned
directed information (DI) from data-stream Yj to Yi is given by:




























Y \ {Yi, Yj}.
For the rest of the chapter, we drop the word ‘causally’ for convenience. Note that the
conditional DI from Yj to Yi is positive if and only if the history of Yj gives information
about Yi[t] that could not have been obtained from Yi’s own history and the other
signals from the network. So, if there is no directed edge from j → i in G, then we have
I(Yj → Yi ‖ Yīj̄) = 0.
The following theorem was proved in [78] that specifies a necessary and sufficient
condition to detect a presence of link in the generative graph.
Theorem 5. A directed edge from j to i exists in the directed graph G if and only if
I(Yj → Yi ‖ Yīj̄) > 0.
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Remark 6. In [78], the authors assume positive distribution for the random processes
in Y . The distribution is positive if PY > 0 for all joint sequences Y . This assumption
avoids pathologies that arise in deterministic systems. For example, if Y1[t] are IID
random variables, and Y2[t] = Y1[t− 1] and Y3[t] = Y2[t− 1], then I(Y2 → Y3 ‖ Y1) = 0,
even though Y3 depends on Y2 The positivity assumption ensures that the computed
expectations are non-negative and hence avoids false negatives for true edges in the
generative graph and are therefore detected.
4.4.2 Main Result: Inferring Directed Graphs from Corrupt Data-
streams
In this section we characterize the spurious edges that arise when using conditional
DI to estimate network structure. In particular, we will show that under appropriate
hypotheses, the estimated edges precisely correspond to edges in the perturbed graph,
defined next.
Definition 26 (Perturbed Graph). Let G = (V,A) be a generative graph. Suppose
Z ⊂ V is the set of perturbed nodes with each perturbation model admitting a description
provided by (4.4). The perturbed graph, GZ = (V,AZ), is a directed graph where there is
an edge i→ j ∈ AZ if and only if there is a trail, trlG : i = v1− v2−· · ·− vk−1− vk = j
in G such that the following conditions hold:
P1) If j /∈ Z, then vk−1 → j ∈ A.
P2) For m ∈ {2, 3, . . . , k − 1}, if vm−1 → vm ← vm+1, and vm /∈ Z, then vm+1 ∈ Z.
P3) If vm is a node such that vm−1 − vm − vm+1 is a sub-path of the path v1 − . . .− vk
and vm is not a collider, then vm ∈ Z.
Remark 7. Note that the existence of a trail that does not meet the ‘if ’ conditions
in P1), P2) and P3) guarantees that i → j ∈ AZ . For example, if i → j ∈ A then
i → j ∈ AZ . Indeed, if j /∈ Z then i → j ∈ AZ by condition P1).Conditions P2) and
P3) are not applicable. On the other hand, if j ∈ Z, then none of the conditions P1),
P2) or P3) are applicable to the trail i→ j. So, i→ j ∈ AZ .
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Definition 27 (Spurious Links). Let G = (V,A) be a generative graph, Z ⊂ V be the
set of perturbed nodes and GZ = (V,AZ) be the perturbed graph. Spurious links are
those links i→ j ∈ AZ that do not belong to A.
The conditions in P1-P3 specifies a path characterization based on the location of
corrupt nodes. This defines the paths through which spurious probabilistic relations are
introduced due to data corruption. These probabilistic relations are captured by trails
in PDBN that become active due to data-corruption. The following theorem precisely
gives a relationship between the active trails in PDBN and the directed edges in the
perturbed graph.
Theorem 6. Consider a generative graph, G = (V,A), consisting of N nodes. Let
Z = {v1, . . . , vn} ⊂ V be the set of n perturbed nodes where each perturbation is described
by (4.4). Denote the data-streams as follows: UZ := {Ui}i∈Z and YZ̄ := {Yj}j∈Z̄ where
Z̄ = V \Z. Let the measured data-streams beW = UZ∪YZ̄ = {W1,W2, . . . ,WN}. Let the












}) holds in G′Z for all t > 0.
Proof. The proof is given in appendix C.1.
We will now show that if conditional directed information, I(Wi → Wj ‖ Wj̄ī), are
computed using corrupted data-streams, and were applied for causal structure inference,
then we infer the perturbed graph that contains spurious links.
Corollary 2. Consider a generative graph, G = (V,A), consisting of N nodes. Let
Z = {v1, . . . , vn} ⊂ V be the set of n perturbed nodes where each perturbation is described
by (4.4). Denote the data-streams as follows: UZ := {Ui}i∈Z and YZ̄ := {Yj}j∈Z̄ where
Z̄ = V \ Z. Let the measured data-streams be W = UZ ∪ YZ̄ = {W1,W2, . . . ,WN}. Let
the perturbed graph be GZ = (V,AZ). If I(Wi →Wj ‖ Wj̄ī) > 0, then i→ j ∈ AZ .
Proof. We will show that if i → j /∈ AZ , then I(Wi → Wj ‖ Wj̄ī) = 0. Sup-
pose, i → j /∈ AZ . Let G′Z = (V ′, A′Z) be the perturbed dynamic Bayesian network
(DBN) associated with the perturbed graph, GZ . Then, using Theorem 6, for all






















will hold true for all t and thus,
I(Wi →Wj ‖ Wj̄ī) = 0.
47
The following example illustrates the intuition for the presence of spurious links in
the perturbed graph.
Example 1. Consider a generative graph as shown in Figure 4.4 (a). Suppose node 3 is
subject to packet drop corruption model in (4.7) and let U3 be its measured data-stream.
Denote the measured data-streams at nodes 1 and 2 as Y1 and Y2. U3 is related to its ideal
counterpart Y3 via (4.8). The measured data-streams are {W1 = Y1,W2 = Y2,W3 = U3}.
Since measurements of node 3 are corrupted, measurements of Y1 and Y2 can give useful
information for predicting states at node 3 that would not be available in the noisily
measured history of U3. Thus, I(W1 →W3 ‖W2) > 0 and I(W2 →W3 ‖W1) > 0. The
perturbed graph is shown in figure 4.4 (b).
1 2 3
(a) True Graph, G.
1 2 3
(b) Perturbed Graph, GZ .
Figure 4.4: This figure illustrates the intuition behind spurious links in Example 1.
Figure 4.4(b) shows the perturbed graph inferred. Spurious links are shown in red and
the true edges are depicted in black.
The results in Theorem 6 and Corollary 2 respectively shows that existence of active
trails is the PDBN and non-zero conditional directed information is sufficient to infer the
presence of a directed link in the perturbed graph. However, under a mild assumption
on the generative and the perturbation model, it can be shown that the respective
conditions are also necessary to detect a directed link in the perturbed graph.
Assumption 1. Let the following conditions on the generative and the perturbation
model hold:
C1) In the generative model (4.1), for all agents i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, and all j ∈ P ′(i),
there is a number kij ≥ 1 such that Yj [t− kij ] is an argument of fi.
C2) For all perturbed nodes i ∈ Z, in the perturbation model (4.4), there is a number
ki ≥ 1 such that gi always takes Yi[t− ki] as it’s argument.
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In addition, let at least one of the following conditions on corruption model hold:
B1) If a node i ∈ Z, then there is a number k′i ≥ 1 such that Yi[t− k′i] is an argument
of fi in (4.1).
B2) If a node i ∈ Z, then Yi[t] is an argument of gi in (4.4).
Remark 8. The above assumption states that the dynamics in generative model (4.1),
Yi[t] depends on at least one previous measurement value of its parent nodes. Similarly,
for the perturbation model (4.4), the corrupt value Ui[t] depends causally on uncorrupted
measurement value. We consider strictly causal interactions in the generative model and
causal interactions in the corruption model and are therefore realistic in many practical
physical systems.
The following theorem asserts that if i→ j ∈ AZ then there exists a corresponding
active trail in perturbed DBN. The proof is given in appendix C.2.
Theorem 7. Consider a generative graph, G = (V,A), consisting of N nodes. Let
Z = {v1, . . . , vn} ⊂ V be the set of n perturbed nodes where each perturbation is described
by (4.4). Denote the data-streams as follows: UZ := {Ui}i∈Z and YZ̄ := {Yj}j∈Z̄ where
Z̄ = V \ Z. Let the measured data-streams be W = UZ ∪ YZ̄ = {W1,W2, . . . ,WN}.
Suppose, the generative model and the perturbation model satisfies the conditions for
dynamics that is mentioned in Assumption 1. If there is a directed edge from i to j in
perturbed graph, GZ = (V,AZ), then there exists a trail between a node in W
(t−1)
i and
Wj [t] that is active given {W (t−1)j ,W
(t−1)
j̄ī
} in G′Z , for some t > 0.
Under the following assumption we can in fact show that I(Wi → Wj ‖ Wj̄ī) > 0 is
also a necessary condition for i→ j ∈ AZ as shown in Corollary 3.
Assumption 2. We assume that the generative model in (4.1) and the perturbation
model in (4.4) are such that the corresponding DBN and PDBN are faithful Bayesian
networks. Moreover, we consider positive joint distributions for the random processes
Y and U .
Corollary 3. Under Assumption 2 and dynamics following Assumption 1, if i → j ∈
AZ , then I(Wi →Wj ‖Wj̄ī) > 0.
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Proof. By theorem 7, if i→ j ∈ AZ , then there exists an trail in PDBN between W (t−1)i
and Wj [t] that is active given {W (t−1)j ,W
(t−1)
j̄ī
} in G′Z , for some t > 0. Under faithfulness














. Thus, I(Wi →
Wj ‖ Wj̄ī) > 0.
Remark 9. The faithfulness assumption is justified as the unfaithful probability distri-
butions are restricted to a set of Lebesgue measure zero [36]. Here, system parameters
for which the algebraic conditions for the conditional independence hold true with true
dynamical dependencies must belong to the set of measure zero.
4.5 Summary
We studied the problem of inferring directed graphs for a large class of networks that
admit nonlinear and strictly causal interactions between several agents. Our analysis
further reinforces that spurious links arising from data corruption is a more general
phenomenon. We provided necessary and sufficient conditions that delineates the effects
of data corruption on the directed network structure inferred using directed information.
We presented a tight characterization for the spurious links that arise due to corruption
of data-streams by determining their location and orientation. Our results serve as a
necessary first step in understanding what part of network reconstruction can be trusted





In the previous chapter, we provided necessary and sufficient conditions that delineates
the effects of data corruption on the directed network structure inferred using directed
information. In this chapter, a method for estimating measures of statistical dependency
in networks of nonlinear dynamical interactions from the observed time-series data is
developed. We develop a conditional directed information estimator for time-series
admitting finite alphabets and establish consistency results for the estimator. Using
this estimator, we verify the theoretical predictions of inferring and localizing spurious
links in the directed graph using corrupt data streams.
Given the time-series W, the reconstruction of the perturbed graph is accomplished
by (i) computing the conditional directed information, I(Wi → Wj ‖ Wj̄ī) (ii) placing
a link from node i to j if I(Wi → Wj ‖ Wj̄ī) > 0. Thus, the algorithm requires
computation of I(Wi → Wj ‖ Wj̄ī) for all pairs of nodes (Wi,Wj) in W. Toward
computing the conditional directed information we refer to methods based on Context-
Tree-Weighting (CTW) in [181], which provide estimates on conditional probability
mass function (PMF) of a time-series admitting values in a finite alphabet. For the
reminder of this section, we consider fi in (4.1) and gi in (4.4) to be such that Yi[t]
and Ui[t] belong to finite alphabet. Here, from time sequence x
(n) (recall the notation of
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x(n)), the PMF Q(x[i] | x(i−1)) for all i = 1, . . . , n is computed where n is the length of
the sequence. Q is also called as sequential probability assignment for a sequence x(n).
Furthermore it is shown in [182] that Q computed is a Universal Probability Assignment
as discussed next.
5.2 Universal Probability Assignment
The following definition characterizes the probability mass function Q in relation to the
true mass function P in terms of the length of the time-series. It establishes that as the
horizon of the time-series is extended, the sequential probability assignment estimate,
Q, approaches the true PMF P.
Definition 28 (Universal Probability Assignment). Let P be the true joint PMF of












where estimated joint PMF for x(n) is given by Q(x(n)) = Q(x[0])Q(x[1] | x[0])Q(x[2] |
x(1)]) · · ·Q(x[n] | x(n−1)). Similarly, P (x(n)) can be factorized.
For the rest of the article Q is estimated by CTW algorithm which is a universal
probability assignment as discussed in [182] for each time series. The only assump-
tions made are that the sequences belong to a finite alphabet and are stationary and
ergodic Markov sequences of a bounded order D. That is, for a Markov sequence X,
P (x[t]|x(t−1)) = P (x[t]|xt−1t−l ) where l ≤ D. The CTW algorithm uses a weighted distri-
bution to take into account of all possible D-bounded Markov sources and estimates the
sequential probability, Q(x[t]|x(t−1)) for every symbol x[t] given the past observations.
The computational complexity of CTW algorithm is linear in horizon length n, of the
sequences considered.
5.3 Pairwise Estimation of Directed Information
Here, a pairwise estimator of directed information between a pair of random process
proposed by [182] is described. Let X and Y be jointly stationary and ergodic processes.
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The directed information from X to Y can be expressed in terms of the entropy as
follows:
I(X → Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y ‖ X) (5.2)
where H(Y ) = E[− logP (Y )] and H(Y ‖ X) = E[− logP (Y ‖ X)] denotes the entropy
of Y and the causally conditioned entropy [183] respectively.
The directed information rate (DIR) from X to Y is defined as:




I(x(n) → y(n)). (5.3)
The directed information rate in (5.3) characterizes the directed information from X to




let Hr(Y ‖ X) := limn→∞ 1nH(y
(n) ‖ x(n)). Thus, if Hr(Y ) and Hr(Y ‖ X) converge,
then Ir is convergent. That is,
Ir = Hr(Y )−Hr(Y ‖ X). (5.4)
In [182], the following DIR estimator is defined:














Q(y[i] | x(i−1), y(i−1)) · log 1
Q(y[i] | x(i−1), y(i−1))
(5.5)
In [182], consistency results for estimating directed information (DI) between a pair
of random processes from data was proposed. In this article we provide consistency
results of the conditional directed information estimator by showing convergence in
almost sure sense (denoted as P-a.s).
5.4 Estimation of Conditional Directed Information
Let X,Y, Z be jointly stationary and ergodic processes. The conditional directed in-
formation from X to Y conditioned on Z can be expressed in terms of the entropy as
follows:
I(X → Y ‖ Z) = H(Y ‖ Z)−H(Y ‖ X,Z). (5.6)
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The causally conditioned directed information rate (DIR) from X to Y now is defined
as:




I(x(n) → y(n) ‖ z(n)). (5.7)
Let Hr(Y ‖ X,Z) := limn→∞ 1nH(y
(n) ‖ x(n), z(n)). Thus, if Hr(Y ‖ Z) and Hr(Y ‖
X,Z) converge, then Ir is convergent. That is,
Ir = Hr(Y ‖ Z)−Hr(Y ‖ X,Z). (5.8)
The conditional directed information estimator Î(x(n) → y(n) ‖ z(n)) is defined as under:






Q(y[i] | x(i−1), y(i−1), z(i−1))·log 1







Q(y[i] | x(i−1), y(i−1), z(i−1)) · log 1
Q(y[i] | x(i−1), y(i−1), z(i−1))
(5.9)
The following theorem establishes the consistency result in estimating conditional DIR
as defined in (5.9). The proof is given in appendix D.1.
Theorem 8. Let Q be the probability assignment in the CTW algorithm. Suppose,
X,Y, Z are jointly stationary irreducible aperiodic finite-alphabet Markov processes whose
order is bounded by the prescribed tree depth of the CTW algorithm. Then,
lim
n→∞
Î(x(n) → y(n) ‖ Z(n)) = Ir(X → Y ‖ Z) P-a.s, (5.10)
For computing (5.9), first Q(x[i], y[i], z[i] | x(i−1), y(i−1), z(i−1)) and Q(y[i], z[i] |
y(i−1), z(i−1)) are estimated using CTW for all realizations of tuples (x[i], y[i], z[i]) and
(y[i], z[i]). The estimated probabilities are tabulated and the required marginalized
conditional probabilities Q(y[i] | x(i−1), y(i−1), z(i−1)) and Q(y[i] | y(i−1), z(i−1)) in (5.9)
are computed from this table for entropy estimation.
5.5 Simulation Results
To verify the predictions of Theorem 6, we first performed a simulation on a network
consisting of 3 nodes with a single node being perturbed and on a network consisting
of 6 nodes, of which 2 are corrupt. We estimate the directed information rates (DIR),
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which are DI estimates that are averaged along the sequence length until the horizon.
We used the estimator described in (5.9) to compute DIR. For both the networks, the





(c) DIR Estimates comparison
Figure 5.1: This figure shows how unreliable measurements at node 3 results in spuri-
ously inferring a causal influence from 1 → 3 and 2 → 3. 5.1(b) shows the perturbed
graph inferred. Spurious edges are shown in red while true edges are in black.
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5.5.1 Single node Perturbation
Consider a network consisting of 2 nodes with a common child as shown in Fig. 5.1(a).
The true generative model is described as follows:
Y1[t] = E1[t],
Y2[t] = (|Y1[t− 1]− Y1[t− 2]| · Y3[t− 1]2 · E2[t]) mod 3,
Y3[t] = E3[t]
where E1[t] ∼ Categorical(3, [0.15, 0.35, 0.5]), E2[t] ∼ Categorical(3, [0.35, 0.35, 0.3])
and E3[t] ∼ Categorical(3, [0.4, 0.2, 0.4]). Each of Y1[t], Y2[t] and Y3[t] has a finite
alphabet {0, 1, 2}.
The perturbation considered here is the packet-drops uncertainty at node 3. The
corruption model takes the form:
U3[t] =
(Y3[t] + U3[t− 1]) mod 3, with probability 0.55(Y3[t− 1] + U3[t− 1]) mod 3, with probability 0.45.
The perturbed graph predicted by Theorem 6 is shown in Fig. 5.1(b). The DIR
estimates from ideal (Y ) and unreliable measurements (U) are shown in Fig. 5.1(c).
We observe non-zero DIR estimates and add edges to GZ respectively. In particular,
note the substantial rise in I(U1 → U3 ‖ U2) and in I(U2 → U3 ‖ U1). This indicates













Figure 5.2: 5.2(a) shows true generative graph. 5.2(c) depicts DIR estimates to detect
links from nodes 1 and 2 using ideal measurements Y and when there is corruption
at nodes 2 and 5. 5.2(b) shows the perturbed graph inferred. The spurious links are
shown in red and the true edges are shown in black. With cascaded perturbations, more
spurious links are inferred.
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Consider a network of 6 nodes as shown in Fig. 5.2(a). The dynamic interactions in
the true generative model are as follows:
Y1[t] = E1[t],
Y2[t] = Y1[t− 1]||E2[t],
Y3[t] = Y2[t− 1]||E3[t],
Y4[t] = E4[t],
Y5[t] = (Y2[t− 1]||Y4[t− 1])&E5[t],
Y6[t] = Y5[t− 1]||E6[t]
where E1[t] ∼ Bernouilli(0.55), E2[t] ∼ Bernouilli(0.5), E3[t] ∼ Bernouilli(0.2), E4[t] ∼
Bernouilli(0.4), E5[t] ∼ and E6[t] ∼ Bernouilli(0.3)and ‘||’ is logical ‘OR’ operation while
‘&’ is logical ‘AND’ operation. Each of Y1[t], Y2[t], . . . , Y6[t] has a finite alphabet {0, 1}.
The perturbations considered here are time-origin uncertainties at nodes 2 and 5. The
corruption models takes the form:
U2[t] =
Y2[t− 2], with probability 0.5Y2[t], with probability 0.5.
and
U5[t] =
Y5[t− 2], with probability 0.5Y5[t], with probability 0.5.
The perturbed graph predicted by Theorem 6 is shown in figure 5.2(b). The DIR
estimates from ideal (Y ) and unreliable measurements (U) are shown in figures 5.2(c)
and 5.3. We observe non-zero DIR estimates and add edges to GZ respectively. For
clarity of visualization, only non-zero DIR estimates predicted by Theorem 6 are shown.
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(a) DIR estimates
(b) DIR estimates from f and 6
Figure 5.3: DI estimates to detect links from nodes 3,4,5 and 6. Notice the large number
of non-zero DIR estimates computed from corrupt measurements corresponding to links
from nodes 3 and 6 which had no children in the true generative graph that now has
lot of children nodes in GZ .
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5.6 Summary
We developed a method for estimating measures of statistical dependency in networks
of nonlinear dynamical interactions from the observed time-series data. Specifically,
a conditional directed information estimator for time-series admitting finite alphabets
and finite Markov order is developed and convergence results for the estimator were
established. Simulation results were provided to verify the theoretical predictions to







In this chapter, we show that our precise characterization of the spurious links from
Chapter 4 can be further exploited when the network has special structural properties.
There are several physical systems, especially flow-driven systems like power grid [116,
184], fluid flow [118,121] and heat transfer networks [122], where every dynamic coupling
between the agents/nodes is bi-directional. Such a framework is also applicable in many
engineered systems such as networks of oscillators [185] and consensus networks [186].
In such systems, identifying unidirectional links in reconstruction lead to the conclusion
that such links arise from data corruption. Using our precise characterization of spurious
links, we develop a procedure to detect the location of all corrupt nodes in bi-directed
networks.
We consider causal and non-linear dynamical interactions between the agents. Di-
rected information method is first employed to infer the corrupt graph from uncertain
data-streams. We then use graph theory tools to isolate the corrupt nodes by observing
the directed graph inferred. We remark here, that the solution methodology provides
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an effective method to detect sources of corruption that only involve examining paths
in the constructed graph.
6.2 Perturbed Graphs for Bi-directional Networks
In this section, we will provide a precise characterization of network structure inferred
using corrupt data-streams for bi-directional networks. Recall the description of gen-
erative models as described in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we consider bi-directional
generative models whose associated generative graph G = (V,A), is bi-directional. That
is for all i→ j ∈ A, we also have j → i ∈ A. We use i
 j to denote i→ j and i← j.






















Its associated generative graph is shown in Fig. 1(a). Note that for all i in {1, 2, 3},
i→ i is not shown.
1
2 3
Figure 6.1: This figure shows a bi-directional generative graph.
We consider data corruption models and directed information based inference pro-
cedure described in Chapter 4. Recall that there are spurious links introduced in
the inferred perturbed graph. The following proposition provides a precise and simpli-
fied characterization for perturbed graphs for networks whose generative graphs are
bi-directional.
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Proposition 1. Let G = (V,A) be a bi-directional generative graph. Let Z ⊂ V be set
of perturbed nodes and let GZ = (V,AZ) be the corresponding perturbed graph. Then,
i→ j in AZ if and only if either one of the following condition holds:
B1) i
 j in G or
B2) There is a trail of length at least 3, i = v1 
 v2 
 v3 
 · · · 
 vk = j, such that
for every pair of consecutive nodes vm, vm+1 with m ≥ 2 at least one of vm or
vm+1 is in Z.
6.3 Identification of Corrupt Nodes
We consider an important class of bi-directional networks whose operational topology
or configuration is a tree. Such networks are prevalent across many applications such as
electricity distribution grids [21], gas transmission networks [187], water networks [188],
and information broadcasting [100]. In the previous section we gave a precise charac-
terization of perturbed graphs for networks whose generative graphs are bi-directional.
It is conceivable that if there are unidirectional links in the network structure inferred
using data-streams, then there are corrupt nodes. We will now see how the location of
unidirectional spurious links can be utilized to detect corrupt nodes. For the rest of the
section we have the following assumption on the perturbations.
Assumption 3. Let G = (V,A) be a bi-directional generative graph. Let Z ⊂ V be
the set of perturbed nodes satisfying (4.4). We consider perturbations that satisfy the
following: for every unperturbed node i ∈ V there exists at least one more unperturbed
node j ∈ V such that i
 j holds in G.
Remark 10. The above assumption states that we consider perturbations such that
every unperturbed node in the generative graph is connected to at least one other un-
perturbed node. However, any node(corrupt/unperturbed) can be can be connected to
multiple perturbed nodes. Thus, the above assumption is not restrictive.
Theorem 9 is the main result which detects the exact location of all the corrupt
nodes in the network. To this, we will require the following definitions.
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Definition 29 (Topology). Suppose G = (V,A) is a directed graph. The topology of the
graph G is an undirected graph Gτ = (V,Aτ ), where Aτ = {i− j | i→ j ∈ A} ∪ {i− j |
i← j ∈ A}.
Definition 30 (Tree). An undirected graph G = (V,A) is called a tree if there is a
unique path connecting any two nodes in V .
Definition 31 (Bi-directional Clique). Suppose, G = (V,A) is a directed graph. A
subset of nodes S ⊂ V forms a bi-directional clique in G if i → j ∈ A and j → i ∈ A
for all i, j ∈ S.
Definition 32 (Bi-directional Neighbors). Suppose, G = (V,A) is a directed graph.
The bi-directional neighbors of a node i ∈ V , bidNr(i), is given by: bidNr(i) = {j | i

j holds in G}.
Theorem 9. Suppose G = (V,A) is a bi-directional generative graph with the topology,
Gτ = (V,Aτ ), being a tree. Let Z ⊂ V be the set of perturbed nodes satisfying (4.4) and
Assumption 3. Let U = {u1, . . . , uN} be the measured data streams. Let GZ = (V,AZ)
be the perturbed graph. Consider the following statements:
T1) i→ j ∈ AZ
T2) j → i /∈ AZ .
T3) j and bidNr(j) form a bi-directional clique in GZ .
If statements T1) and T2) hold, then j is corrupted if and only if statement T3) holds.
The following algorithm describes the procedure to detect all perturbed nodes in the
network.
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Algorithm 1 Detection of Corrupt Nodes
Input: Perturbed Graph, GZ = (V,AZ).
Output: Set of perturbed nodes, Z.
Init: Z ← {}.
for all i→ j ∈ AZ do
if j → i /∈ AZ then
if ∀p, q ∈ bidNr(j), p
 q holds in GZ then





In this subsection, we provide examples and discuss the significance of the detection
procedure described above.
Example 2 (Non-Linear System). Consider a network consisting of 3 nodes as shown
in Figure 6.2(a)). The true generative model is described by:
y1[t] = e1[t].y2[t− 1], (6.1a)
y2[t] = y1[t− 1] + y3[t− 1] · e2[t], (6.1b)
y3[t] = y2[t− 1] + e3[t] (6.1c)
where e1[t] ∼ Bernouilli(0.2), e2[t] ∼ Bernouilli(0.2) and e3[t] ∼ Bernouilli(0.35), and
‘+’ is the logical ‘OR’ operation and ‘·’ is the logical ‘AND’ operation. Each of y1[t], y2[t]
and y3[t] has a finite alphabet {0, 1}. The perturbation considered here is the time-origin
uncertainty at node 3. The corruption model takes the form:
u3[t] =
y3[t− 3], with probability 0.33y3[t], with probability 0.67. (6.2)
We used the methods proposed in [182] to compute directed information rate(DIR).
The perturbed graph is shown in Figure 6.2(b)). Observe that only node 3 forms a
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bi-directional clique with all its bi-directional neighbors. Thus, by Theorem 9, it is a
perturbed node.
1 2 3
(a) Ideal Measurements Y
1 2 3
(b) Unreliable Measurements U .
(c) Comparison of DIR estimates between perfect measurements and corrupted data-streams.
Figure 6.2: Directed Information estimates: Note that only I(y3 → y1||y2) and
I(y1 → y3||y2) keeps decreasing and asymptotically reaches zero. On the other hand,
there is a rise in I(u1 → u3||u2) and it plateaus as sample length grows while I(u3 →
u1||u2) continues to decrease. I(u2 → u3||u1) shoots and plateaus at an increased value
compared to I(y2 → y3||y1) while other DI estimates continue to increase. We therefore
infer the perturbed graph in Fig. 6.2(b)).
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1 2 3 4 5
(a) True Generative Graph
1 2 3 4 5
(b) True kin graph
1 2 3 4 5
(c) Perturbed kin graph
1 2 3 4 5
(d) Directed perturbed graph
Figure 6.3: This figure shows how graph theory notions can detect corrupt nodes from
the inferred directed perturbed graph. In 6.3(d)), node 3 forms bi-directional clique
with all its bi-directional neighbors as shown in dashed red arrows. This does not hold
for unperturbed nodes.
Example 3 (Linear System). Let the generative graph, G, be as showin in Fig. 6.3(a))
with the following dynamics:
y1[t] = (H12 ∗ y2)[t] + e1[t]
y2[t] = (H21 ∗ y1)[t] + (H23 ∗ y3)[t] + e2[t]
y3[t] = (H32 ∗ y2)[t] + (H34 ∗ y4)[t] + e3[t]
y4[t] = (H43 ∗ y3)[t] + (H45 ∗ y5)[t] + e4[t]
y5[t] = (H54 ∗ y4)[t] + e5[t]
(6.3)
where Hij are stable LTI filters for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Suppose, node 3 is perturbed.
That is, the measured data-stream for node 3, u3[t], is given by a noisy filter:
u3[t] = (L ∗ y3)[t] + ζ3[t]
where, L is a stable first-order filter and ζ3[t] is an IID Gaussian noise. Let U [t] =[
y1[t] y2[t] u3[t] y4[t] y5[t]
]>
be the vector of observed signals.
If the measurements were unperturbed, the true kin graph (undirected graph) can
be recovered using multivariate Wiener filter [74]. See Fig. 6.3(b)). However, if the
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measurements of y3 are perturbed, then the undirected network structure identified using
Wiener filtering will contain spurious links as proved in 2. In this case, the perturbed
kin graph will be complete, as shown in Fig. 6.3(c). The Wiener filtering method implies
that if i − j is in the kin topology, then the corresponding entry in the inverse power
spectrum satisfies (ΦUU (e





1.052 −1.233 0.007 0.242 −0.073
−1.233 1.621 −0.036 −0.538 0.227
0.007 −0.036 0.028 −0.034 0.005
0.242 −0.538 −0.034 1.515 −1.146
−0.073 0.227 0.005 −1.146 0.983
 . (6.4)
Thus, the Wiener filter method predicts a full graph. Due to high symmetry and com-
pleteness of the graph, it is not possible to detect the corrupt node purely by looking
at the inferred graph structure. Moreover, separation techniques as described in [189]
cannot be used to remove spurious edges.
However, directed perturbed graph yields more insightful results. This could be es-
timated from data using directed information [78], or in the case of linear systems,
Granger causality [190].
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Figure 6.4: Residual Errors. Each line depicts a running estimate of the residual
gap, (6.5). The dashed lines correspond to theoretical predictions, while the solid lines
are the estimates. The green lines correspond to true links i → j ∈ A, the blue lines
correspond to spurious links i→ j ∈ AZ \A, and the red lines correspond to pairs (i, j)
with no predicted link i → j /∈ AZ . As can be seen the green and blue lines plateau
near predicted values while the red lines continue to decrease.
As discussed in [190] Granger causality is equivalent to directed information in the
case of linear Gaussian dynamic systems. Let Uj̄ denote the entries of U other than j
and let Uij denote the entries of U other than i and j. For the Granger filter methods,
we used recursive least-squares to estimate the difference in prediction error residuals:
ri,j = E
[(




uj [t]− E[uj [t]|U t−1ij ]
)2]
. (6.5)
It can be shown that for linear Gaussian systems that ri,j > 0 if and only if I(ui →
uj |Uij) > 0. The results of the estimation are shown in Fig. 6.4. As can be seen,
Fig. 6.3(d) is the inferred perturbed graph, GZ . Applying Theorem 9, we can conclude
node 3 as a perturbed node just by observing the graph structure.
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6.4 Summary
We studied the problem of identifying the location of corrupt nodes in a network. We
described a method to detect all the corrupt nodes in a network admitting causal and
non-linear dynamical interactions with bi-directional coupling between its agents. We
showed that solely by examining the perturbed graph structure we can locate corrupt
nodes. In particular, we showed that a corrupt node will always form a bi-directional
clique with all its bi-directional neighbors.
Chapter 7




Similar to the previous chapter, we consider dynamical systems where every coupling
between agents/nodes is considered to be bi-directional. However, we focus on linear
time-invariant dynamical relations between the agents. Moreover, unlike the problem
setup in the previous chapter, we admit non-causal relations among agents and allow
temporal correlations in the process noise. In the previous chapter, the dependencies in
the generative model were restricted to be strictly causal and allowed only temporally
uncorrelated process noise. Here, an undirected edge between two nodes may be effec-
tively used to represent the bi-directional coupling between them. Thus, identifying the
true Boolean structure (presence or absence of undirected edges) of the network cor-
rectly identifies all the influence pathways in the network. Moreover, we consider radial
networks in this chapter. Radial networks constitute important class of networks that
are prevalent across many applications such as electricity distribution grids [21], gas
transmission networks [187], water networks [188], and information broadcasting [100].




As discussed before, network identification for dynamical systems from time series mea-
surements has been extensively studied in controls community [135], [74], [133], [108],
[82], [105] [112]. In [189], the authors show that for bi-directed LTI system networks
with a radial network topology, the spurious edges in the moral graph can be eliminated
using graphical separation rules. Similarly, phase -based results of the estimated Wiener
filters have been shown to enable removal of spurious edges in non-radial bi-directional
LTI systems [86]. For a network of interacting agents with nonlinear dynamic dependen-
cies, strictly causal interactions and temporally uncorrelated process noise, the authors
in [78] proposed the use of directed information to determine the directed structure of
the network. However, in this work we admit non-causal relations in the generative
model and allow temporal correlations in the process noise. The problem of learning
polytree structures has been studied in [80] and [85]. All the above work assume that
the measurements are uniformly sampled and are available without any non ideal as-
pect like packet drops or random delays. Often, the data-streams in large systems are
not immune to effects of noise [49], asynchronous sensor clocks [41], [45] and packet
drops [54], [56]. In [179] focusing on directed networks with linear time-invariant (LTI)
interactions, authors provided characterization of the extent of spurious links that can
appear due to data-corruption in the moral graph. However, little is known if these spu-
rious edges can be eliminated to infer the exact network structure even in the presence
of corruptions in the data streams, thus establishing consistency guarantees. In [191],
focusing on bi-directional networks, it is shown that the location of corrupt nodes can
be detected by combining tools from information theory and graph theory. However, a
method to eliminate spurious edges was not presented.
7.1.2 Our Contributions
In this chapter the objective is to determine the exact network representation of ra-
dial bi-directional LTI systems, using passive means from corrupt data-streams. Radial
bi-directional LTI systems are characterized by a tree topology with bi-directed edges
between neighbors. We show that for radial bi-directed network of LTI systems where
corrupt nodes are located deep in the network, at least three hops away from the leaf
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nodes, the spurious edges owning to data corruption can be eliminated and the exact
network structure can be inferred. We present novel topological characterizations and
phase-based properties to determine the exact location of corruptions. Finally, we pro-
pose an algorithm called ‘hide and learn’ to determine the exact topology generating
the time series observations. To this, we follow a similar topology learning algorithm,
presented in [127] that considered hidden nodes. However in [127], there was a tighter
assumption on the distance between hidden nodes restricting them to be at least four
hops away from each other and the measurements were assumed to be perfect. Here,
we consider time-series with imperfect information and relax the assumption on the
location of corrupt nodes, and provide rigorous proofs to our results.
The data corruption models considered are same as described in Section 2.3 of
Chapter 2. In Section 7.3.1, we present the main result to determine the location of
corrupt nodes. The exact topology learning algorithm is presented in Section 7.3.2.
7.2 Preliminaries
In this section the generative model and the generative graph that represents the net-
worked system are presented.
7.2.1 Generative Model
Consider N agents that interact over a network. Consider the following continuous time









bijxj(t) + wi(t), (7.1)
where the process wi(t) is considered to be zero mean WSS process innate to agent
i and thus wi is independent of wj if i 6= j. Thus, the power spectral density (PSD)
of w = (w1, w2, . . . , wN )
T , Φw(z), is a diagonal matrix. Above, am,i, bij ∈ R for all
m ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that at least one am,i is non-zero. We assume the signals are
bounded in a mean-square sense: E[‖ xi[t] ‖2] < ∞ and E[‖ wi[t] ‖2] < ∞. Taking
73







bijxj(s) + wi(s), (7.2)
where xi(s) and wi(s) are the Laplace transform of xi(t) and wi(t) respectively. With
∆t as sampling time and using bi-linear transformation of s = 2(1−z
−1)
∆t(1+z−1) , we obtain the












is the z domain operator determined by the
derivatives of xi(t). Note that other discretization methods could also be used and our




Gij(z)xj(z) + ei(z) for i = 1, . . . , N. (7.4)




Compactly, (7.4) is equivalent to
x = G(z)x+ e, (7.5)
where x = (x1(z), x2(z), . . . , xN (z))
T and e = (e1(z), e2(z), . . . , eN (z))
T and G(i, j) =
Gij(z). We call the pair (G(z), e) the generative model. We consider bi-directed gener-
ative models such that Gij(z) 6= 0 if and only if Gji(z) 6= 0. Such models are prevalent
in linearized models of engineering systems operating around an equilibrium point. For
example, consider swing dynamics for power systems and heat transfer dynamical sys-
tems.
Remark 11. Note that the accuracy of discretization will affect the sparsity of the net-
work structure in the discrete time model. The sampling time, ∆t, must commensurate
with the time constants and dynamics of the system for the sampling-related non-zero
entries to be negligible. For the rest of the chapter, we assume that the signals are

























(b) Generative Topology GT
Figure 7.1: A generative graph and its tree topology.
7.2.2 Graphical Representation
The structural description of (7.4) induces a generative graph G = (V,
−→
A ) formed by





A = {i → j|Gji 6= 0}. For bi-directional dynamical
systems, it follows that i→ j ∈
−→
A if and only if j → i ∈
−→
A. . Thus, G is a bi-directed
graph. Given the generative graph G for a bi-directional system, its generative topology
is the undirected graph GT = (V,A) formed by replacing all directed edges in
−→
A with
undirected edges such that multiple undirected edges between any two nodes is replaced
by a single undirected edge between those same nodes. Here, the set A = {(i, j) | i →
j ∈
−→
A} ∪ {(i, j) | j → i ∈
−→
A}. The following definitions on undirected graphs will be
useful for subsequent analysis. Figure 7.1 represents a bi-directed system.
Definition 33 (Path). Nodes w1, w2, . . . , wn ∈ V forms a path in an undirected graph,
G = (V,A), if for every i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1 we have wi−wi+1 in A. The path is denoted
by w1 −w2 · · · −wn. The length of the path is one less than the number of nodes in the
path.
Definition 34 (n-Hop Neighbor). Given an undirected graph, G = (V,A), a node j ∈ V
is a n-hop neighbor of i ∈ V if there is a path of length n between i and j in G. We will
denote n hop neighbors of i as n− hop(i). We refer 1-hop neighbors as neighbors.
Definition 35 (Leaf Node/Non-leaf Nodes). In a tree, GT = (V,A), a node i ∈ V
that has only one neighbor is called a leaf node. Nodes with more than one neighbor are
called non-leaf nodes.
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Definition 36 (Radial Systems). If the generative topology, GT , associated with a bi-
directional generative model, (G(z), e), is a tree, then the generative system is called a
radial system.
Figure 7.1 represents a radial system.
7.2.3 Moral/Kin Graph Inference from Time Series
In Chapter 2, we discussed the relationship between the sparsity pattern of inverse PSD
matrix of time sereis, x and the moral graph, GM of a generative model. For a radial
system, we can express Φ−1xx more explicitly, where the non-zero entries only correspond
to diagonal entries, neighbors and 2-hop neighbors in GT . For a radial system:
Φ−1xx (i, j) =

−Gij(z)Φ−1ei − Gji(z
−1)Φ−1ej , j ∈ 1− hop(i)
Gki(z−1)Gkj(z)Φ−1ek , j ∈ 2− hop(i)
and k ∈ 1− hop(i), k ∈ 1− hop(j)
Φ−1ei +
∑
k∈1−hop(i) |Gki|2Φ−1ek , i = j
0, otherwise.
(7.6)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(a) Generative graph
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(b) Kin graph inferred using perfect measure-
ments
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(c) Perturbed graph inferred with corruption at
node 4
Figure 7.2: This figure shows how unreliable measurements at a node can yield in
erroneous dynamic influences.
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7.3 Exact Topology Learning from Corrupt Data Streams
The first step towards exact topology learning is to determine the location of all the
corrupt nodes. We consider data perturbation models as discussed in Chapter 2.
Consider a chain network consisting of 7 nodes with bidirectional dynamics between
adjacent nodes as shown in 2.2(a). The true moral graph is depicted in figure 7.2(b).
Suppose 4 is corrupted. Applying, Theorem 3, the inferred undirected graph is shown
in figure 7.2(c). We consider the following assumption on the location of corrupt nodes:
Assumption 4. C1) Corrupt nodes are at least 3 hops away from all leaf nodes in the
generative topology.
C2) Corrupt nodes are at least 3 hops away from each other in the generative topology.
Remark 12. The above condition C1) implies that the corrupt nodes are located deep
in the network such that its effects are felt by the agents that have perfect measurements.
Moreover, C1) implicitly implies that every node has a 2-hop neighbor in the generative
topology. We consider arbitrarily large networks satisfying this, and with at least one
corrupt node. In particular, the smallest network permitted is a 7 node chain as shown
in Figure 7.2(a)) with node 4 being corrupted.
7.3.1 Corruption Detection
A method to locate the corrupt nodes in the inferred perturbed graph for radial dynam-
ical systems is presented in this section. To this, we first characterize the topological
properties of the neighborhood set of leaf and corrupt nodes in the inferred perturbed
graph.
Neighborhood characterization
The following proposition states that that if i is a leaf or a corrupt node, its neighborhood
set in the inferred perturbed graph, GU , is completely determined by the set of 1-hop
and 2-hop neighbors of i in the generative topology, GT .
Proposition 2. Consider a radial system with generative topology GT = (V,A) consist-
ing of N nodes with the moral graph GM = (V,AM ). Let 1−hop(i) and 2−hop(i) denote
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the set of 1-hop and 2 hop neighbors of i in GT . Let Y ⊂ V be the set of perturbed nodes
where each perturbation satisfies (2.10) and Assumption 4. Suppose GU = (V,AU ) is
the perturbed graph inferred using Theorem 3. Let neighbors of node i in GU be Nu(i).
If i is a leaf node in GT or i ∈ Y , then Nu(i) = 1− hop(i) ∪ 2− hop(i).
Proof. We will show that no additional nodes excluding 1−hop(i) or 2−hop(i) neighbors
exist as neighbors of i in GU . Suppose j is a neighbor of i in GU such that j /∈
1 − hop(i) ∪ 2 − hop(i). Then, by definition of perturbed graph, there should be a
path i − v1 − v2 − j in GM such that v1 and v2 are corrupt nodes. This implies v1
belongs to 1−hop(i) or 2−hop(i) in GT . Suppose i is a corrupt node. This contradicts
condition C2). Suppose i is a leaf node. This contradicts condition C1). Therefore,
Nu(i) = 1− hop(i) ∪ 2− hop(i).
We will then use the following lemma that describes a topological method to detect a
set of “candidate” nodes which contains only leaf and corrupt nodes using the perturbed
graph. It states that only leaf nodes and corrupt nodes has a neighborhood that forms
a clique in the perturbed graph. The proof is given in Appendix F.1.
Lemma 2. Consider a radial dynamical system with generative topology GT = (V,AT ).
Let Y ⊂ V be the set of perturbed nodes where each perturbation satisfies (2.10) and
Assumption 4. Suppose GU = (V,AU ) is the perturbed graph inferred using theorem 3.
Consider any node i in V . Neighbors of node i in GU , Nu(i)∪ {i} will form a clique in
GU if and only if i is a leaf node in generative topology GT or i is a corrupt node.
Detection of corrupt nodes
After a “candidate” set containing corrupt nodes and leaf nodes are determined as
discussed above, we will now isolate the corrupt nodes exactly. The following theorem
precisely detects the corrupt nodes separately based on phase properties of entries in
inverse PSD. The proof is given in Appendix F.2
Theorem 10. Suppose GT = (V,AT ) is the generative topology corresponding to a
radial dynamical system. Let Y = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} ⊂ V be set of corrupt nodes with each
corruption satisfying (2.10) and Assumption 4. Suppose GU = (V,AU ) is the perturbed
graph inferred using theorem 3. Let B be the set of nodes detected using Lemma 2 whose
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neighborhood, Nu(i) forms a clique with {i} in GU . Take a node i ∈ B. Then, i has at
least two neighbors, p, q in GU with non-constant ∠Φ−1uu (i, p)(ω) for all ω ∈ (−π, π] if
and only if i is a corrupt node in GT .
The above result detects the set of corrupt nodes, y, from the candidate set, B, and
hence the remaining nodes B \ y are the leaf nodes. Further, Theorem 10 delineates
that only leaf nodes have one unique entry in Φ−1uu with a non-constant phase response.
This corresponds to the true edge associated with the leaf node. Let EL be this set
of edges. Thus, in addition to corrupt nodes, we also detect leaf nodes and remove
spurious edges associated with leaf nodes applying Theorem 10. The procedure is
described comprehensively in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Detection of Corrupt Nodes and Isolating True Edges Associated with
Leaf Nodes
Input: Time series measurements, u.
Output: Set of perturbed nodes, Y , set of leaf nodes, L, and set of true edges, EL associated with leaf nodes.
Init: AZ ← {}, Y ← {}, L← {}, EL ← {}.
1: Compute inverse PSD, Φ−1uu .
2: for all i ∈ V , i 6= j do
3: if Φ−1uu (i, j)(ω) 6= 0 then
4: AZ ← AZ ∪ {i− j}
5: end if
6: end for
7: for all i ∈ V do
8: εi ← {}.
9: if Nu(i) ∪ {i} forms a clique in GZ = (V,AZ) then
10: for all j ∈ Nu(i) do
11: if ∠Φ−1uu (i, j)(ω) is not constant for all ω ∈ (−π, π] then
12: εi ← εi ∪ {i− j}
13: end if
14: end for
15: if Cardinality of εi ≥ 2 then
16: Y ← Y ∪ {i}





7.3.2 Hide and Learn Algorithm
The steps to recover the exact topology of the radial linear dynamical system using
imperfect information are presented in this section. To accomplish this we follow hide
and learn strategy. This is described in Algorithm 3 that has three stages: First, hide
the measurements of the corrupt nodes. We infer the graphical structure of the network
by observing sparsity pattern of inverse PSD using only the nodes that has perfect
information by marginalizing out the corrupt node measurements. That is, the corrupt
nodes will be treated as latent nodes. This graph will contain spurious edges. This
constitutes lines 1 to 7 in Algorithm 3. Second, identify the true edges in the graph
obtained from previous step. This constitutes lines 8 to 15 in Algorithm 3. Finally,
place the corrupt nodes back at the correct location in the structure resulting from
previous step as described in lines 16 to 29 in Algorithm 3. We now elaborate on each
stage and provide technical results that support and yield Algorithm 3.
Learning with Latent Corrupt Nodes:
Let y be the time series measurements of corrupt nodes, Y , detected after Theorem
10. Let o denote the set of measurements without y. That is, o = u \ y. We compute
the inverse PSD of o. Now, using sparsity pattern in inverse PSD of o as adjacency
matrix construct an undirected graph, Tm = (Vo, Ao). The following result from [127]
characterizes the edges in Tm and the generative topology GT .
Lemma 3. Consider a radial dynamical system with generative topology GT . Then,
Φ−1oo (i, j)(ω) 6= 0 for ω ∈ (−π, π], implies that i and j are within four hops of each other
in GT .
True edge set discovery between observed nodes:
The graph Tm inferred from Lemma 3 contains spurious edges. The objective here is to
eliminate the spurious edges and thus identify the true edges.
The following result from [127] provides a topological method based on separation prop-
erty to identify the observed non-leaf nodes and identify the true edges between them.
Lemma 4. Suppose Tm is the graph inferred using measurements o in Lemma 3.
Suppose there exist observed nodes c, d distinct from observed nodes a, b such that a−b ∈
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Tm. Then, sep(c, d|{a, b}) holds in Tm if and only if a− b is a true edge in GT and a, b
are non-leaf nodes.
Combining Lemma 4 with the output of Algorithm 2 that detected the only true edge
associated with all the leaf nodes, we have thus identified all true edges associated with
the observed nodes. Denote this graph as Θ.
Placement of Corrupt Nodes
The graph Θ will have multiple radial disconnected components denoted as θj , with
the disconnections being at the location of the latent corrupt nodes, Y . Based on
our assumptions, it can be shown that each disconnected component has at least two
observed nodes. Thus, for all node p ∈ θj , there is another node q ∈ θj such that
p−q ∈ GT . Since GT is a connected graph, the final step is to connect the disconnected
components by placing the corrupt nodes at the disconnected locations. We make use
of the prior knowledge gained by inferring the perturbed graph GU and we map every
corrupt node i ∈ Y to it’s corresponding neighborhood Nu(i) in GU . The following
lemma precisely characterizes this. The proof is given in the Appendix F.3.
Lemma 5. Let Θ be the disconnected network inferred after removing spurious edges
between the observed nodes based on Lemma 4. Consider two disconnected components
θ1, θ2 in Θ with observed nodes q ∈ θ1 and r ∈ θ2. Consider all p ∈ θ1 and all
s ∈ θ2 such that p− q and r− s are edges in θ1 and θ2 respectively. Consider a corrupt
node l ∈ Y . Suppose {p, q, l, r, s} forms a clique in the perturbed graph, GU . Then,
p − q − l − r − s holds in GT if and only if ∠Φ−1uu (ω)(p, s) is a constant (equal to 0 or
π) for all ω ∈ (−π, π].
Theorem 11 is the main result of the chapter which states that Algorithm 3 precisely
learns the exact topology of a radial system with imperfect information once the corrupt
nodes have been detected using Algorithm 2. The proof is given in the Appendix F.3.
Theorem 11. Suppose Y is the set of perturbed nodes, L is the set of leaf nodes and
EL is the set of true edges associated with leaf nodes detected from Algorithm 2. Then,
Algorithm 3 results in learning the true generative topology is GT = (V,A) for the
corresponding radial system.
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Algorithm 3 Exact Topology Learning: Hide and Learn
Input: Inputs and outputs from Algorithm 2.
Output: Set of true edges, A, in generative topology GT .
Init: Set of observed edges, Ao ← {}.
Isolate non-corrupt measurements, o = u \ y. Observed nodes Vo = V \ Y .
Using measurements o, compute inverse PSD, Φ−1oo .
for all i ∈ Vo, i 6= j do
if Φ−1oo (i, j)(ω) 6= 0 then
Ao ← Ao ∪ {i− j}
end if
end for
Non-leaf nodes, Vnl = V \ L. True edge set, ET ← EL.
for all p, q ∈ Vnl such that (p, q) ∈ Ao do
if There exist K 6= {} and S 6= {} such that sep(K,S|{p, q}) holds then
ET ← ET ∪ {(p, q)}, A← A ∪ ET
end if
end for
d← number of disconnected components in the graph, Θ = (Vo, ET ). (i.e Θ = ∪di=1θi).
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} and j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , d} do
if There exists nodes q ∈ θi and r ∈ θj such that (p, q) ∈ θi and s − r ∈ θj holds for some other
observed nodes p, s then
for all l ∈ Y do
if {p, q, l, r, s} forms a clique in GZ and if Φ−1uu (p, s)(ω) is constant for all ω ∈ (−π, π] then






Figure 7.3: Magnitude Plots The magnitude of inverse power spectral density esti-
mates computed from corrupt data streams u are shown in the here. Notice the entries
are non-zero across the frequency grid. To each non-zero entry, we add undirected edges
to infer the perturbed graph as shown in Figure 7.2(c)) following theorem 3.
7.4 Simulation Result
In this section we demonstrate the topological learning algorithm via a numerical ex-
ample. Let the true generative graph, G, be as shown in Fig. 7.2(a)) with the following
dynamics:
x1[t] = 0.5x2[t− 1] + e1[t]
x2[t] = 0.36x1[t− 1] + 0.6x3[t− 1] + e2[t]
x3[t] = 0.95x2[t− 1]− 1.7x4[t− 1] + e3[t]
x4[t] = 0.51x3[t− 1] + 0.55x5[t− 1] + e4[t]
x5[t] = 1.5x4[t− 1] + 0.6x6[t− 1] + e5[t]
x6[t] = 0.7x5[t− 1] + 0.5x7[t− 1] + e6[t]
x7[t] = 0.65x6[t− 1] + e7[t]
(7.7)
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where ei are white noise sequences. The corruption model for node 4 is:
u4[t] =
x4[t− 2], with probability 0.7x4[t], with probability 0.3. (7.8)
Figure 7.4: Phase Plots. The estimated phase response values are shown in the figure.
We observe that the phase response corresponding to edges to the leaf nodes, {1, 7},
have only non-constant phase response. Node 4 has two neighbors with non-constant
phase response. This verifies predictions of Theorem 10. The phase response estimate
of 2− 6 link is approximately close to zero and is a constant. This verifies Lemma 5.
From a trajectory length of 107, the estimates for power spectral density was ob-
tained using MATLAB ‘cpsd’ command. The plot for magnitude of the inverse power
spectral density estimates is shown in Figure 7.3. Step 1: Using Theorem 3, adding
edges and constructing an undirected graph results in the perturbed graph shown in
figure 7.2(c)). Step 2: We notice that neighbors of 1,4 and 7 forms a clique with nodes
1,4 and 7 respectively. As predicted by Lemma 2, we have identified the candidate
set, {1, 4, 7}, containing corrupt nodes and leaf nodes only. Step 3: The next step is
to detect the corrupt node. To this we observe the phase response of the inverse PSD
estimated. Figure 7.4 shows that only 4 will have at least two non-constant phase esti-
mates. For leaf nodes, there will only be one non-constant phase plot. Using Theorem
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10 we determine node 4 as the corrupt node. Step 5: The next step is to follow the hide
and learn algorithm. We first remove the measurements of node 4 and infer the topology
of the network with latent node 4. That is, using the measurements O = {1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7},
we compute the inverse PSD. The magnitude of Φ−1oo is shown in Figure 7.5. Following
Lemma 3 yields the undirected graph shown in figure 7.6(a)).
Figure 7.5: Magnitude plots with unobserved node 4. The magnitude of the
inverse PSD estimates computed from o = u \ {4} are shown here. y axis is angular
frequency ω in radians/s. Notice the entries are non-zero across the frequency grid. To
each non-zero entry, we add undirected edges to infer the undirected graph as shown in
Figure 7.6(a)) following Lemma 3.
1 2 3 5 6 7
(a) Inferred undirected graph with latent
node 4.
1 2 3 5 6 7
(b) Detect true edges
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(c) Place hidden (corrupt) node 4.
Figure 7.6: Illustration of Hide and Learn algorithm.
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Then, using graphical separation results mentioned in Lemma 4, we detect the true
edges in the inferred network. This yields two disconnected components as shown in
Figure 7.6(b)). Finally, we place the latent node at the point of disconnection and
obtain the true generative topology shown in Figure 7.6(c)).
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed an exact topology learning algorithm for radial bi-directed
network of LTI systems in the presence of corruption. We show that for networks where
corrupt nodes are three or more hops away from each other deep inside the network,
the spurious edges owning to data corruption can be eliminated and the the exact
network structure can be determined. We used clique characterization in the inferred
undirected graph to determine the set of leaf and corrupt nodes. Then using phase
properties of the inverse PSD, we isolated the location of corrupt nodes. Finally, we
hide the corrupt node measurements and adopt hide and learn strategy to learn the
exact network representation generating the time series observations. We remark here
that Algorithm 2 and 3 will still work to learn the exact network structure even when
there are hidden nodes and corruption simultaneously as long as the location of hidden
nodes and the corrupt nodes are at least 3 hops away from each other and at least 3
hops away from the leaf nodes.
Chapter 8
Future Directions
The primary emphasis of this research was to incorporate realistic modeling assumptions
on data streams and characterize the effects of data corruption on network identification
using passive means. We showed that identifying the structure of networked systems
using corrupt measurements results in the inference of spurious links. Moreover, we
provided exact characterization on the location of such spurious links. Application of
our results for network design and fault/attack-detection could be explored in specific
cyber-physical application domains such as heat-transfer models and power distribution
grids. Such experimental analysis will significantly broaden the scope of techniques
pursued in this dissertation into cyber-security domain.
A pertinent direction of future work could be on quantifying the amount of data that
is needed to detect network inter-relationships using statistical measures of dependency.
In this dissertation, we used conditional directed information (DI) measure and stud-
ied the asymptotic consistency of DI measures focusing on finite alphabets. In many
practical applications, the amount of measurements available are finite and continuous
valued. Thus, it is necessary to quantify the amount of samples required and provide
confidence intervals in estimating DI from finite samples of data that are not restricted
to finite alphabets.
An interesting problem to work in future could be to quantitatively differentiate
between the true and spurious influences. It will be interesting to devise sufficient
statistical conditions on computed DI that delineates these differences in the estimated
DI due to data corruption. This could entail rigorously devising sufficient statistical
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conditions on corruption models and quantifying the effects on measures of statistical
dependency in networked time-series. Such assessment can facilitate elimination of
spurious links that arise due to measurement uncertainties.
Our results serve as a necessary first step in understanding what part of network
reconstruction can be trusted to facilitate accurate system identification. We can be-
gin with linear time-invariant systems and generalize to consider nonlinear dynamical
systems. Verifying identifiability conditions [82], [103] and quantifying error in the
identified transfer function due to data corruption from true dynamics can be another
interesting line of work. Another interesting direction could be to consider network
reconstruction for non-target specific nonlinear dynamical systems. Non-target specific
network reconstruction for linear systems studied in [192] and [79] may yield useful
insights in this direction.
We considered the problem of detecting corrupt nodes and exact topology infer-
ence for radial bi-directed systems. Extension entails relaxing the assumption that the
topology is a tree, and consider generic graphical structures that underlie the networked
time-series. Inclusion of correlated disturbances and latent nodes framework will further
expand the scope of network identification.
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Appendix A
Network Structure Identification
in LTI Systems using Corrupt
Data Streams
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Define the following deviations from the mean: ∆Ai[t] = Ai[t]− Āi, ∆Bi[t] = Bi[t]− B̄i,
∆Ci[t] = Ci[t]− C̄i, and ∆Di[t] = Di[t]− D̄i
Note that the Lyapunov equation, (2.9), can be expressed as:
P = Ā>i PĀi + E[∆Ai[t]>P∆Ai[t]] +Q  Ā>i PĀi +Q. (A.1)
Here S  T denotes that T − S is positive semidefinite. Since a solution must hold
for all Q, it must hold, in particular for positive definite Q. Thus, Āi must be a stable
matrix.
Set ūi[t] = (hi ? yi)[t] = E[ui[t]|yi], so that ∆ui[t] = ui[t]− ūi[t].
With this notation, the cross spectrum, (2.10b), will be derived:
Ruiyi [t] = E[ui[t]yi[0]] (A.2)
= E[E[ui[t]yi[0]|yi]] (A.3)
= E[(hi ? yi)[t]yi[0]] (A.4)
= (hi ? Ryiyi)[t]. (A.5)
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Here, (A.3) is due to the tower property of conditional expectation. Then (2.10b) follows
by taking Z-transforms.
Since Āi is stable and yi[t] is wide-sense stationary, we must have that ūi[t] is wide-
sense stationary.
Note that by construction, Ruiui [t] = Rūiūi [t] + R∆ui∆ui [t]. Furthermore, we must
have that
Rūiūi [t] = (hi ? Ryy ? h
∗
i )[t], (A.6)
where h∗i is the time-reversed, transposed impulse response. Thus, (2.10a) holds by
taking Z-transforms.
The only part that remains to be proved is that ui is wide-sense stationary. This
will follow as long as ∆ui[t] has a finite autocorrelation.
To show that R∆ui∆ui [t] is bounded, we will explicitly construct an expression for
it. To derive this expression, we need expressions for the autocorrelation of xi and the








[t] and let ∆xi[t] = xi[t] − x̄i[t]. Note that x̄i[t] =
E[xi[t]|yi]. As with ūi, we have that x̄i[t] is wide-sense stationary. Using a derivation









Thus, we see that Rxiyi [t] = Rx̄iyi [t].











By construction, we have that Rxixi [t] = Rx̄ix̄i [t] +R∆xi∆xi [t]. The following lemma
characterizes the autocorrelations of ∆xi[k].
Lemma 6. Assume that a solution to the generalized Lyapunov equation, (2.9), holds
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for all Q. Then R∆xi∆xi [0] is uniquely defined by:





] [Rx̄ix̄i [0] Rx̄iyi [0]








For k > 0,
R∆xi∆xi [k] = Ā
k
iR∆xi∆xi [0]
R∆xi∆xi [−k] = R∆xi∆xi [k]>.
Proof. For k > 0 we have
Rx̄ix̄i [k] +R∆xi∆xi [k]
= E[xi[k]xi[0]>]
= E[(Ai[k − 1]xi[k − 1] +Bi[k − 1]yi[k − 1])xi[0]>]
= ĀiRxixi(k − 1) + B̄iRyixi(k − 1)
= (ĀiRx̄ix̄i(k − 1) + B̄iRyixi(k − 1))
+ ĀiR∆xi∆xi(k − 1)
= Rx̄ix̄i [k] + ĀiR∆xi∆xi [k − 1].




= (Āi + ∆Ai[k])(x̄i[k] + ∆xi[k]) + (B̄i + ∆Bi[k])yi[k]
+ wi[k]− Āix̄i[k]− B̄iyi[k]
= Ai[k]∆xi[k] + ∆Ai[k]x̄i[k] + ∆Bi[k]yi[k] + wi[k].
Furthermore, note that ∆xi[k] is independent of ∆Ai[k] and ∆Bi[k]. The expression
for R∆xi∆xi(0) follows by setting E[∆xi[k + 1]∆xi[k + 1]>] = E[∆xi[k]∆xi[k]>].
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As discussed above, the proof of the theorem will be completed once the autocorre-
lation of ∆ui is characterized. The following lemma gives the desired characterization.
Lemma 7. For k = 0, R∆ui∆ui [0] is given by






] [Rxixi [0] Rxiyi [0]








For k > 0, R∆ui∆ui [k] is given by










] [Rxixi [0] Rxiyi [0]










For k < 0, R∆ui∆ui [k] = R∆ui∆ui [−k].
Proof. Note that ∆ui[k] can be decomposed as:
∆ui[k] (A.13)
= ui[k]− ūi[k] (A.14)
= (C̄i + ∆Ci[k])(x̄i[k] + ∆xi[k]) + (D̄i + ∆Di[k])yi[k] (A.15)
+ vi[k]− C̄ix̄i[k]− D̄iyi[k] (A.16)
= C̄i∆xi[k] + ∆Ci[k]xi[k] + ∆Di[k]yi[k] + vi[k] (A.17)
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As before, ∆xi[k] is independent of ∆Ci[k] and ∆Di[k]. Thus, the expression for
R∆ui∆ui [0] follows by computing E[∆ui[k]2].
For k > 0, note that ∆Ci[k] and ∆Di[k] are independent of ∆Ci[0] and ∆Di[0].
However, ∆xi[k] may be correlated with ∆Ci[0], ∆Di[0], and vi[0]. So, multiplying the
















+ C̄iE[∆xi[k](∆Ci[0]xi[0] + ∆Di[0]yi[0] + vi[0])>] (A.20)
Let Ai[j : k] be the product defined by Ai[k : k] = I and
Ai[j : k] = Ai,j [k − 1]Ai[k − 2] · · ·Ai[j] for j < k. An induction argument shows that
xi[k] = Ai[0 : k]xi[0] +
k−1∑
j=0
Ai[j + 1 : k](Bi[j]yi[j] + wi[j])




Ai[j + 1 : k](Bi[j]yi[j] + wi[j]).
Let F be the σ-algebra generated by yi and all of the random terms:







(Ā+ ∆Ai[0])xi[0] + (B̄ + ∆B0)yi[0] + wi[0]
)
= x̄i[k] + Ā
k−1Ā∆xi[0]+
+ Āk−1(∆Ai[0]xi[0] + ∆Bi[0]yi[0] + wi[0]).
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Using the tower property gives:
E[∆xi[k](∆Ci[0]xi[0] + ∆Di[0]yi[0] + vi[0])>]
= E[E[∆xi[k](∆Ci[0]xi[0] + ∆Di[0]yi[0] + vi[0])>|F ]]
= Āk−1E[(∆Ai[0]xi[0] + ∆Bi[0]yi[0] + wi[0])
· (∆Ci[0]xi[0] + ∆Di[0]yi[0] + vi[0])>],
where the last equality used that ∆xi[0] is independent of ∆Ai[0], ∆Bi[0], and vi[0].
Combining this result with (A.19) gives the desired expression for R∆u∆u(k). The
expression for R∆u∆u(−k) follows because ∆ui[k] is a real scalar.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
First, we will describe the structure of Φuu(z). For compact notation, we will often drop
the z arguments.
For p = 1, . . . , N , if p is not a perturbed node, set Hp(z) = 1 and θp(z) = 0. With
this notation, (2.10) implies that the entries of Φuu are given by:
(Φuu)pq =
Hp(Φyy)pqH∗q if p 6= qHp(Φyy)ppH∗p + θp if p = q
When p 6= q, there is no θ term because the perturbations were assumed to be indepen-
dent.






whereH is the diagonal matrix with entriesHp on the diagonal andDvk(z) = bvkθvk(z)bTvk
where bvk is the canonical unit vector with 1 at entry vk.
Set Ψ0 = HΦyyH
∗. For k = 0, . . . , n− 1, we can inductively define the matrices:




For k = 1, . . . , n let Zk = {v1, . . . , vk} and let GMZk be the perturbed graph con-
structed by adding edges i− j to the original moral graph if there is a path from i to j
whose intermediate nodes are all in Zk.
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We will inductively prove the following claim: For k = 1, . . . , n, if (Ψ−1k )pq 6= 0, then
p and q are neighbors in GMZk . Proving this claim is sufficient to prove the theorem,
since Ψn = Φuu and Zn = Z.
First we focus on the k = 1 case. Using the Woodbury Matrix identity we have,
Ψ−11 = Ψ
−1














0 (z)bv1 is a
scalar. Therefore, (Ψ−11 )pq = (Ψ
−1
0 )pq − (Γ1)pq.
If (Ψ−11 )pq 6= 0 then at least one of the conditions (i) (Ψ
−1
0 )pq 6= 0 or (ii) (Γ1)pq 6= 0
must hold.
Suppose that (Ψ−10 )pq 6= 0. Then (H−∗(z)Φ−1yyH−1(z))pq 6= 0. As H is diagonal it
follows that (Φ−1yy )pq 6= 0. From Corollary 1, it follows that p and q are neighbors in
GM . Thus p and q are neighbors in GMB1 .








v1 6= 0. Thus




0 )q 6= 0. Noting that Ψ0 = HΦyyH
∗, it follows that ,
(Φ−1yy )pv1 6= 0 and (Φ−1yy )v1q 6= 0. From Corollary 1 it follows that v1 − p and v1 − q
are edges in the moral graph GM . Thus, there is a path from p to q whose only inter-
mediate node is v1 ∈ Z1. Thus, p, q are neighbors in GMZ1 and the claim is verified for
k = 1.
Now assume that the claim holds for some k > 1. Combining the Woodbury matrix

















k (z)bvk+1 is a scalar.
As before, if (Ψ−1k+1)pq 6= 0, then either (Ψ
−1
k )pq 6= 0 or (Γk+1)pq 6= 0.
If (Ψ−1k )pq 6= 0, then the induction hypothesis implies that p and q are neighbors in




If (Γk+1)pq 6= 0, then as in the k = 1 case, we must have that (Ψ−1k )pvk+1 6= 0 and
(Ψ−1k )vk+1q 6= 0. This implies that p − vk+1 ∈ A
M
Zk
and vk+1 − q ∈ AMZk . Thus, either p
and vk+1 are kins in the original moral graph, or there is a path from p to vk+1 whose
intermediate nodes are in Zk. Similarly, for q and vk+1. It follows that there is a path









B.1 Proof for Lemma 1
We will prove the lemma for discrete random variables. The proof for continuous random
variables is identical except that marginalization would be represented by integrals
instead of sums.
Let Z = {v1, . . . , vn}, Z0 = ∅ and Zk = {v1, . . . , vk}. We will prove inductively that
(YZ̄k , UZk) factorizes with respect to GZk .
The base case with Z0 = ∅ is immediate since (YZ̄0 , UZ0) = Y and GZ0 = G. Now
assume inductively that (YZ̄k−1 , UZk−1) factorizes with respect to GZk−1 for some k ≥ 1.
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P (YZ̄k−1 , UZk−1)Ψvk,(vk)p(yvk , uvk) (B.2)
The first line, (B.1) follows by marginalizing YZk out of the factorized distribution from
(3.4). Then the terms are regrouped and then (B.1) is employed for P (YZ̄k−1 , UZk−1).
By induction, we have that P (YZ̄k−1 , UZk−1) factorizes according to a collection of
cliques, C, in GZk . Let Cvk ⊂ C be the collection of cliques such that vk ∈ c for all
c ∈ Cvk . For compact notation, let X = (Y, UZ). Then the formula for P (YZ̄k , UZk) can
be expressed as









The second term on the right is a collection of factors corresponding to cliques in GZk−1 .
Now, since AZk−1 ⊂ AZk , they must also be cliques of GZk . The lemma will be proved
if the variables first term on the right correspond to a clique in GZk .
Say i 6= vk and j 6= vk are nodes corresponding to variables in the sum in (B.3).
Then there must be paths from i to vk and vk to j such that any intermediate node is in
Zk−1. Now, since vk ∈ Zk, there is a path from i to j such that all of the intermediate
nodes are in Zk. Thus, the nodes in the sum form a clique in GZk .
B.2 Proof for Theorem 4
From lemma 1 we know that U factorizes according to GZ . Thus, positivity of P (U)
implies that the pairwise Markov property is equivalent to U factorizing according to
GZ . See [174]. Therefore, sep(i, j|V \ {i, j}) (in GZ) if and only if ui ⊥ uj | Uīj̄ . Note
that sep(i, j|V \ {i, j}) means precisely that i− j /∈ AZ .
Appendix C
Effects of Data Corruption on
Network Identification for
Nonlinear Systems
C.1 Proof for Theorem 6
We will show that if i→ j /∈ AZ , then there is no trail between W (t−1)i and Wj [t] that
is active given {W (t−1)j ,W
(t−1)
j̄ī
} in the PDBN G′Z , for all t > 0. However, trail in G′Z
between W
(t−1)
i and Wj [t] can contain future state node αbm [tm] such that tm ≥ t and
bm ∈ V . Note that such nodes are not observed in {W (t−1)j ,W
(t−1)
j̄ī
} and can therefore
make the trail in PDBN active. However, the following lemma proves that such nodes




Lemma 8. Consider a generative graph, G = (V,A), consisting of N nodes. Let Z =
{v1, . . . , vn} ⊂ V be the set of n perturbed nodes where each perturbation is described
by (4.4). Denote the data-streams as follows: UZ := {Ui}i∈Z and YZ̄ := {Yj}j∈Z̄ where
Z̄ = V \ Z. Let the measured data-streams be W = UZ ∪ YZ̄ = {W1,W2, . . . ,WN}. Let
G′ = (V ′, A′) be the dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) associated with G and G′Z =
(V ′Z , A
′
Z) be the perturbed DBN. If i → j /∈ A and if a trail in G′Z between W
(t−1)
i and
Wj [t] contains a node αbm [tm] such that tm ≥ t and bm ∈ V , then for all t > 0, the trail






Proof. Consider any trail from a node in W
(t−1)
i to Wj [t] in G
′
Z . Denote this by trlG
′
Z :=
Wi[t1] = αb1 [t1] − αb2 [t2] − · · · − αbr−1 [tr−1] − αbr [tr] = Wj [t] where 0 ≤ t1 < t. Here,
bk denotes the corresponding vertex in V for k = {1, 2, . . . , r}. Also, αbk [tk] = Ubk [tk] if






The trail has length at least 3. As i → j /∈ A and if j /∈ Z, then Yj [t] does not
dynamically depend on process Yi and clearly not on Ui. If j ∈ Z, then by (4.4), Uj [t]
does not dynamically depend on Yi nor Ui. Thus, there is no direct link of the form
αi[t
′] → αj [t”] in G′Z , for any t′, t”. In particular, Wi[t1] → Wj [t] /∈ G′Z . Thus, there
are at least 3 nodes in the trail, trlG′Z .
Unobserved collider in trail. Without loss of generality, choose tm = max{t1, . . . , tr−1} ≥
t. Consider the sub-trail subtrl′ := αbm−1 [tm−1] − αbm [tm] − αbm+1 [tm+1] of trlG′Z . By
maximality of tm, tm ≥ tm−1 and tm ≥ tm+1. We will show that one of αbm−1 [tm−1], αbm [tm],
and αbm+1 [tm+1] is a collider not in θ and therefore the trail trlG
′
Z cannot be active given
θ.
Suppose tm > tm−1 and tm > tm+1. Then, subtrl
′ is of the form, αbm−1 [tm−1] →
αbm [tm]← αbm+1 [tm+1]. Note that, as tm ≥ t, it follows that neither αbm [tm] nor any of
its descendants can be in θ and hence not observed.
Now, consider tm > tm−1 and tm = tm+1. (The case of tm > tm+1 and tm = tm−1
can be proven similarly). By the generative model in (4.1), by strict causality, for any
node p ∈ V , Yp[tp] does not dynamically depend on any Yq[tp] for q ∈ {p,P ′(p)}. By the
perturbation model described by (4.4), for any q ∈ Z, Uq[tq] dynamically depends only
on {U (tq−1)q , Y (tq)q }. As tm = tm+1, we therefore have bm = bm+1 such that bm ∈ Z and,
one of αbm [tm] and αbm+1 [tm+1] is actually a perturbed measurement Ubm [tm] while the
other being Ybm [tm].
Suppose αbm [tm] = Ubm [tm]. Then, αbm+1 [tm+1] = Ybm [tm]. As tm > tm−1, subtrl
′ is
in fact αbm−1 [tm−1]→ αbm [tm] = Ubm [tm]← αbm+1 [tm+1] = Ybm [tm]. Therefore, αbm [tm]
is a collider and as tm ≥ t, it is not observed in θ.
Suppose instead that αbm [tm] = Ybm [tm]. Then, αbm+1 [tm+1] = Ubm [tm]. As bm ∈






}. Thus, we have
αbm−1 [tm−1] − αbm [tm] = Ybm [tm] → αbm+1 [tm+1] = Ubm [tm] ← αbm+2 [tm+2] in trlG′Z .
Therefore, αbm+1 [tm+1] is a collider not observed in θ.
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Proof of Theorem 6
For rest of the proof, denote θ := {W (t−1)j ,W
(t−1)
j̄ī
}. Note that if i→ j /∈ AZ , then there
is no directed edge from i to j in G, and every trail from i to j in G violates at least one
of the conditions of Definition 26. We will consider these cases separately and show that
no active trail exists in G′Z in each case. Denote any trail connecting a node in W
(t−1)
i
and Wj [t] in G
′
Z , by trlG
′
Z := Wi[t1] = αb1 [t1]−αb2 [t2]−· · ·−αbr−1 [tr−1]−αbr [tr] = Wj [t]
where 0 ≤ t1 < t and bk denotes the corresponding vertex in V for k = {1, 2, . . . , r}.
Here, αv[tv] = Uv[tv] if v ∈ Z or αv[tv] = Yv[tv] otherwise. Using Lemma 8, if any
t′ in {t2, . . . , tr−1} is such that t′ ≥ t, then trlG′Z is not active. Now, consider 0 ≤




Z , can be
mapped to a trail in G, trlG := i = v1 − v2 − v3 . . . vk−1 − vk = j as follows:
Initialize: k = 1 and v1 = b1.
for l = 1 : r − 1 do
if bl+1 6= bl in αbl [tl]− αbl+1 [tl+1] along trlG′Z then
Set vk+1 = bl+1.
Add edge vk − vk+1 with the same direction as
αbl [tl]− αbl+1 [tl+1].
Set sk = tl and τk+1 = tl+1
Set k = k + 1
end if
end for
Additionally, note that vk − vk+1 corresponds to an edge αvk [sk]− αvk+1 [τk+1] in G′Z .
Now, let us reason out why such a construction is always feasible. To this, we
claim that for any successive pair αbl [tl] − αbl+1 [tl+1], either bl = bl+1 or, bl 6= bl+1
and bl − bl+1 ∈ A with the same direction as in αbl [tl] − αbl+1 [tl+1]. Assume αbl [tl] →
αbl+1 [tl+1]. (The case of αbl [tl] ← αbl+1 [tl+1] is similar). Then, either tl = tl+1 or
tl < tl+1. Consider, tl = tl+1. Then, the link must have the form Ybl [tl] → Ubl [tl], as
this is the only instantaneous influence defined in (4.1) or (4.4). Thus, bl = bl+1 in this
case.
Suppose, tl < tl+1. Either, bl+1 ∈ Z or bl+1 /∈ Z. Consider bl+1 ∈ Z. By the
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}. Therefore, bl =
bl+1. Suppose, bl+1 /∈ Z. Then, αbl+1 [tl+1] = Ybl+1 [tl+1]. By the generative model in
(4.1), we either have dynamic dependence on self-history or history of other nodes. That







q }. Then, bl = bl+1 when there is dependence
on self-history. Otherwise, bl ∈ P ′(bl+1). Thus, bl → bl+1 ∈ A. Let us consider an
example- from a trail of the form U1[t1]← Y1[t2]← Y2[t3]→ Y3[t4]→ Y3[t5]→ U3[t] in
G′Z , a trail trlG in G can be constructed as 1← 2→ 3.
Additionally, we may assume that form = 2, · · · , r−1 we have that αbm [tm] 6= Wi[tm]
in trlG′Z . If αbm [tm] = Wi[tm] for some m > 1, then the sub-trail of trlG
′
Z , Wi[tm] =
αbm [tm]−αbm+1 [tm+1]−· · ·−αr[tr] = Wj [t] is a trail from Wi[tm] ∈W
(t−1)
i to Wj [t]. This
trail is of strictly shorter length than trlG′Z . Thus, if the shorter trail cannot be active
then the longer trail, trlG′Z , cannot be active either. Also, by following the construction
procedure described above, this condition implies that vl 6= i for l = 2, 3, · · · , k in trlG.
Call this condition loopi. To summarize, let trlG := i = v1 − v2 − v3 . . . vk−1 − vk = j
be any trail connecting i and j in G constructed by following the above procedure from
the trail trlG′Z : Wi[t1] = αb1 [t1] − αb2 [t2] − · · · − αbr−1 [tr−1] − αbr [tr] = Wj [t]. Since,
i→ j /∈ AZ , this trail must violate any of the conditions P1), P2) and P3). We will now
consider these cases separately and prove that there is no corresponding active trail in
G′Z .
If condition P1) is violated, then trlG must have that j /∈ Z and vk−1 ← j. In this
case, Wj = Yj . Then, either br−1 = j or br−1 6= j. By construction of trlG, if br−1 6= j,
then br−1 = vk−1. As vk−1 ← j, we must then have αbr−1 [tr−1] ← αbr [tr]. However,
this implies tr = t < tr−1 which violates the condition that 0 ≤ t1, t2, t3, . . . , tr−1 < t.
Thus, br−1 = j. That is, αbr−1 [tr−1] = Yj [tr−1]. As tr−1 < t and j /∈ Z we have
αbr−1 [tr−1] = Yj [tr−1]→ αbr [t] = Yj [t] as a sub-trail of trlG′Z . Clearly, yj [tr−1] is not a
collider. As tr−1 < t, we have yj [tr−1] ∈ θ. Thus the trail cannot be active.
Recall the definitions of sk and τk+1 during construction of the trail in G. If condition
P2) is violated, then a sub-path of trlG, vm−1 → vm ← vm+1, must have a collider, vm,
such that vm /∈ Z and vm+1 /∈ Z where m = {2, 3 · · · , k−1}. If vm+1 = j and τm+1 = t,
P1) also fails, and the argument above shows that the trail in G′Z is not active. If
vm+1 = j and τm+1 < t then we have that αvm+1 [τm+1] = Yvm+1 [τm+1] ∈ θ which is
an observed node along the trail and is not a collider. Thus, the trail trlG′Z cannot be
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active. So, assume that vm+1 6= j. By condition loopi, m+1 6= i. As vm ← vm+1 ∈ trlG,
by construction we must have Yvm [sm] = αvm [sm] ← αvm+1 [τm+1] = Yvm+1 [τm+1] along
trlG′Z with τm+1 < sm < t. Note that since vm+1 /∈ Z and τm+1 < t, αvm+1 [τm+1] =
Yvm+1 [τm+1] is an observed non-collider in θ. Thus, the trail cannot be active.
Finally consider the case that P3) is violated. Then along the trail, trlG, in G,
there must be a sub-trail vm−1 − vm − vm+1 such that the intermediate node, vm, is
not a collider and vm /∈ Z. As vm is not a collider, there is one outgoing directed
edge from vm in the trail trlG to either vm−1 or vm+1. By construction, there must be
a corresponding node αvm [tf ] in the trail trlG
′
Z such that it has an outgoing edge to
either αvm−1 [tp] or αvm+1 [tq] for some tp > tm or tq > tm respectively. Clearly, there
is one αvm [tm] in trlG
′
Z which is a non-collider. Then, as vm /∈ Z, we must have that
αvm [tm] = Wvm [tm] = Yvm [tm]. Note that vm 6= i by condition loopi. As tm < t, αvm [tm]
is an intermediate non-collider node in θ and is thus observed. Hence, trlG′Z cannot be
active.
C.2 Proof for Theorem 7
Suppose i→ j is in AZ . Then there is a trail, trlG, described by i = v1−v2−· · ·−vk = j
in G satisfying conditions in Definition 26. We will first construct a trail in the perturbed
DBN, G′Z , from a node in W
(t−1)
i to Wj [t] for some t > 0. We can construct a trail in G
′
Z
as follows: for all l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}, set tl = tl+1 − kvl+1vl if vl → vl+1 holds in trlG.
Otherwise, set tl = tl+1+kvlvl+1 if vl ← vl+1 holds in trlG. Such a construction is feasible
because by condition C 1), numbers kvl+1vl and kvlvl+1 exists for all l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k− 1}
and at all times. Thus, we have a trail Yi[t1]−Yv2 [t2]−Yv3 [t3]− . . .−Yvk−1 [tk−1]−Yj [tk].
For all m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} if vm ∈ Z, there exists a number km > 0 following conditions
C 2). If B 2) also holds, then km ≥ 0. Let t > max{t1, . . . , tk−1}, and for all m ∈
{1, 2, . . . , k} if vm ∈ Z, let t > tm + km also hold. Depending on whether i or j is a
perturbed node, we have four cases on either end of the above trail.
A) Consider the case i, j ∈ Z. As i ∈ Z, using condition C 2) Ui[t1 + ki]← Yi[t1] holds
true. Choose t sufficiently large so that t > t1 + ki also holds. As j ∈ Z, using
C 2), t can be sufficiently large so that we have Yj [tk] → Uj [t] where t = tk + kj
and kj ≥ 1. If B 1) holds, then we can choose t sufficiently large such that at the
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end of the trail we take s steps from Yj [tk] to Uj [t] such that the tail is of the form
Yj [tk]→ Yj [tk + k′j ]→ · · · → Yj [tk + sk′j ]→ Uj [t] with t = tk + sk′j + kj . Thus, the
constructed trail in G′Z is either Wi[t1 +ki] = Ui[t1 +ki]← Yi[t1]−Yv2 [t2]−Yv3 [t3]−
· · ·−Yvk−1 [tk−1]−Yj [tk]→ Uj [t] = Wj [t], orWi[t1+ki] = Ui[t1+ki]← Yi[t1]−Yv2 [t2]−
Yv3 [t3]−· · ·−Yvk−1 [tk−1]−Yj [tk]→ Yj [tk +k′j ]→ · · · → Yj [tk + sk′j ]→ Uj [t] = Wj [t]
with t > max{t1 +ki, t1, . . . , tk, . . . , tk+sk′j}, and for all m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} if vm ∈ Z,
t > tm + km.
B) Consider the case i ∈ Z but j 6∈ Z. Choose t as tk. As i ∈ Z, using condition
C 2) Ui[t1 + ki] ← Yi[t1] holds true. Choose t sufficiently large so that t > t1 + ki
also holds. Thus, we have constructed a trail in G′Z which is of the form: Wi[t1 +
ki] = Ui[t1 + ki] ← Yi[t1] − Yv2 [t2] − Yv3 [t3] − · · · − Yvk−1 [tk−1] − Yj [t] = Wj [t] with
t > max{t1 + ki, t1, . . . , tk−1}, and for all m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} if vm ∈ Z, t > tm + km.
C) Consider the case i 6∈ Z but j ∈ Z. Following arguments presented in case (A)
we conclude that the constructed trail of form Wi[t1] = Yi[t1] − Yv2 [t2] − Yv3 [t3] −
· · · − Yvk−1 [tk−1] − Yj [tk] → Uj [t] = Wj [t], or of form Wi[t1] = Yi[t1] − Yv2 [t2] −
Yv3 [t3]−· · ·−Yvk−1 [tk−1]−Yj [tk]→ Yj [tk +k′j ]→ · · · → Yj [tk + sk′j ]→ Uj [t] = Wj [t]
exists in the perturbed DBN G′Z with t > max{t1, . . . , tk, . . . , tk + sk′j}, and for all
m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} if vm ∈ Z, t > tm + km.
D) Consider the case i 6∈ Z and j 6∈ Z. Following arguments presented in Case (B) we
conclude that the trail Wi[t1] = Yi[t1]− Yv2 [t2]− Yv3 [t3]− · · · − Yvk−1 [tk−1]− Yj [t] =
Wj [t] exists in the perturbed DBN G
′
Z with t > max{t1, . . . , tk−1}, and for all
m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} if vm ∈ Z, t > tm + km.
We will now argue that in each of the cases above, the constructed trail is active given




Sub-trails with colliders: For all the trails in G′Z constructed under various cases
above consider a sub-trail of the form Yvm−1 [tm−1] → Yvm [tm] ← Yvm+1 [tm+1]. Clearly,
vm cannot be either i or j. If vm 6∈ Z then as tm < t, we have Yvm [tm] ∈ W
(t−1)
j̄ī
and thus the sub-trail is active. If vm ∈ Z then the corrupted version of Yvm [tm] is




Thus the collider Yvm [tm] has a descendant Wvm [tm + kvm ] ∈ θ. Thus the sub-trail
remains active. Thus no collider can deactivate the trails in G′Z .
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Sub-trails with with no colliders: Now consider any node Yvm [tm] which is not a
collider. Note that in the trails for the cases (A), (B), (C), and (D), Yj and Yi can only
appear as an intermediate node only if they are corrupted. In such cases, neither Yi[t1]
nor Yj [tk] belong to θ. Thus, if Yj or Yi are intermediate nodes, they cannot deactivate
the trails given θ. Consider an intermediate node vm 6∈ {i, j}. From Definition 26P 3),
vm is corrupted. Thus Yvm [tm] 6= Wvm [tm] and Yvm [tm] cannot deactivate the trail as




D.1 Proof for Theorem 8
To prove the theorem, we require two results from [182]. The following lemma shows that
with sufficiently large data, the conditional probability assignment by CTW converges
to the true probability assignment for a Markov process.
Lemma 9. Let Q be the probability assignment described by CTW. Let X be a stationary
and finite alphabet Markov process with finite Markov order which is bounded by the
prescribed tree depth of CTW algorithm. Let P be the true probability for X. Then,
lim
n→∞
Q(x[n] | x(n−1))− P (x[n] | x(n−1)) = 0 P-as. (D.1)
Next, we will later use the following proposition which is a rephrased result from
[182].
Proposition 3. Let Q be the probability assignment in the CTW algorithm. Suppose,
X,Y are jointly stationary irreducible aperiodic finite-alphabet Markov processes whose










Ĥ(y(n) ‖ x(n))−Hr(Y ‖ X) = 0 P-a.s, (D.2)
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Recall the expression for conditional DI estimator from (5.9):







Q(y[i] | x(i−1), y(i−1), z(i−1)) · log 1







Q(y[i] | x(i−1), y(i−1), z(i−1)) · log 1
Q(y[i] | x(i−1), y(i−1), z(i−1))
(D.3)
We will show that the first term (call it T1) in equation (D.3) converges to Hr(Y ‖ Z)
and the second term (call it T2) in (D.3) converges to Hr(Y ‖ X,Z).






y[i]∈Y Q(y[i] | v(i−1), y(i−1)) · log
1
Q(y[i]|v(i−1),y(i−1)) . Using, proposition 3, we
thus have that limn→∞ Ĥ(y
(n) ‖ v(n))→ Hr(Y ‖ V ) almost surely.
Convergence of T1: Subtract Hr(Y ‖ Z) from T1 and express T1 − Hr(Y ‖ Z) =























P (y[i] | x(i−1), y(i−1), z(i−1))·
logP (y[i] | y(i−1), z(i−1))−Hr(Y ‖ Z) (D.5)
By ergodicity, Sn converges to zero almost surely. We need to show that Fn converges












Q(y[i] | x(i−1), y(i−1), z(i−1)) · logQ(y[i] | y(i−1), z(i−1)) (D.6)
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By Lemma 9, the CTW probabilities Q(y[i] | x(i−1), y(i−1), z(i−1)) converges to true
probabilities P (y[i] | x(i−1), y(i−1), z(i−1)) almost surely. Therefore,
lim
i→∞
βi = 0 P-a.s. (D.7)












E.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let ÂZ be the edge set described in the proposition. We will show that ÂZ = AZ .
First, we show that ÂZ ⊂ AZ . Suppose, i → j ∈ ÂZ . If i 
 j was an edge of G,
then i→ j ∈ AZ .
Now, consider the case of a trail of length at least 3 with i = v1 
 v2 
 v3 
 · · ·

vk = j.
Since the network is bi-directional, we can choose the directionality of the edges.
We will show that by suitable choice of directionality, we can retrieve a directed path
between i and j that satisfy all the conditions P1), P2) and P3) for the link i → j to
be in AZ . So, for each pair of nodes along the trail, set the directionality as follows:
 For m ≥ 2, if vm /∈ Z, set vm−1 → vm ← vm+1.
 Set all other edges in the → direction.




P1) If vk = j /∈ Z, then, since the trail has k ≥ 3, we must have k − 1 ≥ 2. So,
we must have that vk−1 ∈ Z. Thus, by our convention for choosing directions, we have
vk−1 → vk. Thus, P1) holds.
P2) If vm is a collider, then we have vm ← vm+1. This directionality is chosen only
when when vm /∈ Z. Furthermore, since vm is a collider, we must have m ≥ 2. Thus,
we have vm+1 ∈ Z. Therefore, P2) holds.
P3) If vm is an intermediate node which is not a collider, then by construction, it
cannot be unperturbed. Thus, P3) holds.
Now, we show that AZ ⊂ ÂZ . Say that i → j ∈ AZ . Let i = v1 − · · · − vk = j be
trail in G that satisfies conditions P1), P2), and P3). If the trail is i− j, then from B1)
we have i→ j ∈ ÂZ .
Now consider the case that the trail has length of at least 3. We must show that for
any pair vm, vm+1 with m ≥ 2, at least one of the nodes is in Z. Since m ≥ 2, we must
have vm−1− vm− vm+1 on the trail. If m is a collider, then P2) implies that vm+1 ∈ Z.
If m is not a collider, then P3) implies that vm ∈ Z. Thus, at least one of vm or vm+1
is perturbed. Thus, i→ j ∈ ÂZ .
E.2 Proof for Theorem 9
Let statements T1) and T2) be true. Now, we will show that j is corrupted if and only
if statement T3) holds.
(⇒) Say that j is corrupted. Let p and q be bi-directional neighbors of j in GZ . We
will show that p → q in GZ as well. Since p and q are arbitrary, switching their roles
shows that we must have p
 q. Furthermore, since p and q are arbitrary bidirectional
neighbors of j, {j} ∪ bidNr(j) must form a bidirectional clique in GZ .
Now, we will show that p → q ∈ AZ . Since p 
 j ∈ AZ and j 
 q ∈ AZ , by
Proposition 1, there must be a trail in G of the form
p = v1 
 · · ·
 vk = j = w1 
 · · ·
 wl = q (E.1)
such that the following conditions hold:
 If vm 
 vm+1 with m ≥ 2, then at least one of vm or vm+1 must be perturbed.
 If wm 
 wm+1 with m ≥ 2, then at least one of wm or wm+1 must be perturbed.
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Note that these conditions automatically hold if the paths have length 2.
Since j ∈ Z, at least one node is perturbed on each of vk−1 
 j and j 
 w2. Thus,
there are no consecutive unperturbed nodes along the subtrail:
v2 
 · · ·
 vk−1 
 j 
 w2 · · ·
 wl = q (E.2)
Thus, p→ q.
(⇐) As i→ j ∈ AZ and j → i /∈ AZ , i→ j is a spurious link. By Proposition 1, there
exists a trail in G, trlG : i = v1 
 v2 
 v3 
 · · ·
 vk−1 
 vk = j, such that there no
two consecutive unperturbed nodes along the subtrail v3 
 v4 
 · · ·
 vk−1 
 vk = j.
Suppose, j /∈ Z for the sake of contradiction. We will show that T3) does not hold,
leading to a contradiction. That is, we will show that there exists at least one subset
of nodes S ⊂ bidNr(j), such that S does not form a bi-directional clique with j in GZ .
Since j /∈ Z, by Assumption 3, there is at least one unperturbed node l such that j 
 l
holds in G. Therefore, vk−1 
 j 
 l exists in G. That is, vk−1 and l are bi-directional
neighbors of j. We will now prove that {vk−1, l} does not form a bi-directional clique
with j in GZ . Particularly, we will show that vk−1 → l /∈ AZ .
To show that vk−1 → l /∈ AZ , we will show that there exists no trail connecting
vk−1 and l in G satisfying conditions P1), P2) and P3). Suppose, there exists a trail
different from vk−1 
 j 
 l in G. Such a trail will imply two paths connecting vk−1
and l in the topology, Gτ , of G. This contradicts the assumption that Gτ is a tree.
Therefore, vk−1 
 j 
 l is the only trail in G that connects vk−1 and l. Now, we
will show that all directed paths in this trail violate at least one of P1), P2) and P3).
Consider the directed path vk−1 → j ← l where j is a collider. As j /∈ Z and l /∈ Z,
condition P2) is not met. Now consider vk−1 → j → l. Then, as j /∈ Z, P3) is violated.
Consider the directed path vk−1 ← j → l. As j /∈ Z, P3) is violated. Finally consider
vk−1 ← j ← l. Again, as j /∈ Z, P3) is violated. Thus all possible directed paths in
vk−1 
 j 
 l violate atleast one of P1), P2) and P3). Thus vk−1 → l cannot be in
the perturbed graph. Therefore, {vk−1, l, j} does not form a bi-directional clique in GZ .
This completes the proof that j must be a perturbed node.
Appendix F
Topology Learning in Radial
Dynamical Systems with
Unreliable Data
F.1 Proof of Lemma 2
(⇒) We will show that if i is neither a leaf node nor a corrupt node, then Nu(i) ∪ {i}
does not form a clique in GU . Note that all nodes in 1−hop(i) and all nodes in 2−hop(i)
will be neighbors of i in moral graph and hence are neighbors of i in GU . We will show
that there exists a pair of nodes a, b ∈ Nu(i) such that a− b does not hold true in GU
and thus N (i)u ∪ {i} cannot form a clique in GU .
By Assumption C2), we have that there is at least one 1-hop neighbor and one 2
-hop neighbor for every node in GT . Consider a ∈ 1− hop(i) and b ∈ 2− hop(i). Then,
a path a− i− p− b exists in GT for some node p ∈ V . Either a is a leaf node or not in
GT . Suppose, a is a leaf node. As GT is a tree, the path a− i− p− b is unique. Thus,
all possible paths between a and b in GM goes through at least one of i, p. As a is a
leaf node, by condition C 1), i, p are not corrupt. Thus, a− b /∈ AU .
Suppose a is not a leaf node. Then, there exists a path c − a − i − p − b in GT .
Thus, c ∈ 2−hop(i) and a neighbor of i in the perturbed graph, GU . We show that c, b
despite being neighbors of i in GU , c− b does not hold true in GU . Similar to argument
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above, since GT is a tree, the path connecting c and b, c− a− i− p− b is unique in GT .
Thus, all possible paths between c and b in GM goes through at least one of a, p and i.
By condition C2), both a and p cannot be corrupt. Thus all possible paths between c
and b in GM goes through at least one non-perturbed node. Thus, c− b /∈ AU .
(⇐) Suppose i is a leaf node in GT or a corrupt node. We will show that Nu(i)∪{i}
forms a clique in the perturbed kin graph, GU . Using Proposition 2, Nu(i) ∪ {i} =
1− hop(i) ∪ 2− hop(i) ∪ {i}.
i is a leaf node: There is only one non-leaf node nl which is a neighbor of i in
GT . Any pair of 2-hop neighbors of i in GT , k1, k2, has a common parent of nl in the
generative graph. Thus, k1 − nl− k2 holds in GT and neighbors in GM . Hence, k1 − k2
holds in GU . Thus, Nu(i) ∪ {i} forms a clique in GU .
i is a corrupt node: For any k1, k2 ∈ Nu(i), there is a path k1 − i− k2 in the moral
graph GM . As i is a corrupt node, k1−k2 holds in GU . Thus, Nu(i)∪{i} forms a clique
in GU .
F.2 Proof of Theorem 10
Structure of inverse power spectra due to corruption
The expressions for Φ−1uu (ω) are explicitly required for the results. To this, we will begin
by describing the general structure of Φ−1uu (ω). For compact notation, we will often drop
the ω arguments.
Consider a network of N nodes. For p = 1, . . . , N if p is not a perturbed node, set
hp(ω) = 1 and θp(ω) = 0. With this notation, (2.10) implies that the entries of Φuu are
given by:
(Φuu)pq =
hp(Φxx)pqh∗q if p 6= qhp(Φxx)pph∗p + θp if p = q.
When p 6= q, there is no θ term because the perturbations were assumed to be indepen-
dent.







whereH is the diagonal matrix with entries hp on the diagonal and Θvk(ω) = bvkθvk(ω)b
T
vk
where bvk is the canonical unit vector with 1 at entry vk.
For k = 0, . . . , n − 1 set Ψk = HΦxxH∗ +
∑k




n . We can
inductively define these matrices as:
Ψ0 = HΦxxH




Note that Ψ−10 (i, j) can be expressed as follows:







Combining Woodbury matrix identity in (F.1) implies that
Ψ−1k+1 = Ψ
−1
k − Γk+1, (F.3)







k+1, and ∆k+1 = θ
−1
vk+1
+ Ψ−1k (vk+1, vk+1) being a
scalar.
Expression for (i, j) entry in Φ−1uu (ω)
Now, we will show that for each candidate node i ∈ B, Φ−1uu (i, j) = Ψ−11 (i, j). For
each i ∈ B, we will inductively prove that for k = 2, . . . , n, Ψ−1k (i, j) = Ψ
−1
1 (i, j).
Consider case k = 2. Using (F.3), Ψ−12 (i, j) = Ψ
−1





2 . Similarly, using (F.3), Ψ
−1
1 (i, v2) = Ψ
−1
0 (i, v2) − Γ1(i, v2)






1 . Here, if i is a corrupt node, v1 = i. By
(F.2), Ψ−10 (v1, v2) =
Φ−1xx (v1,v2)
hv1hv2
. As v1 and v2 are at least 3-hops away in G
T , using
(7.6), Φ−1xx (v1, v2) = 0. Thus, Γ1(i, v2) = 0. Again, by (F.2) Ψ
−1




Since i is either a leaf node or a corrupt node, we have that i, v2 are at least 3 hops
away from each other. Using this and (7.6) we have that Φ−1xx (i, v2) = 0. This implies
Ψ−10 (i, v2) = 0. Therefore, Ψ
−1
1 (i, v2) = 0 and hence Γ2(i, j) = 0. Thus we have proved
that Ψ−12 (i, j) = Ψ
−1
1 (i, j).
Now assume that the claim holds for some k > 2. That is, Ψ−1k (i, j) = Ψ
−1
1 (i, j). By
(F.3), Ψ−1k+1(i, j) = Ψ
−1







Using the induction hypothesis, Ψ−1k (i, vk+1) = Ψ
−1
1 (i, vk+1). As v1, vk+1 and i, vk+1 are
at least 3 hops away from each other respectively, using the same argument as described
before for v1, v2 and i, v2, we have Γk+1(i, vk+1) = 0 and Ψ
−1
k+1(i, j) = Ψ
−1
k (i, j) =




k for k = n, we have established that Φ
−1




Proof of Theorem 10
(⇐) We will show that if i ∈ B is a leaf node in GT , then there is at most only one node
j ∈ Nu(i) such that ∠Φ−1uu (i, j)(ω) is non-constant for all ω ∈ (−π, π]. By Proposition
2, Nu(i) = hop1(i) ∪ hop2(i). Moreover as i is a leaf node, any node j ∈ Nu(i) is not a
corrupt node. Therefore, using (F.2) and preceding discussion, we have
Φ−1uu (i, j) = Ψ
−1
1 (i, j) = Ψ
−1
0 (i, j) = Φ
−1
xx (i, j). (F.4)
Since i is a leaf node, there is only node in hop1(i). Suppose r is that node. We will
show that for all j 6= r ∈ Nu(i) (this means j ∈ hop2(i)), ∠Φ−1uu (i, j) is a constant either
0 or π while ∠Φ−1uu (i, r) is non-constant for all ω.
Take any j ∈ hop2(i). Let q ∈ V be the common neighbor of i and j in GT .
Combining (F.4) and (7.6) we have:







which is a real scalar. Thus, ∠Φ−1uu (i, j) = 0 or π.
Now, consider the node r. By (F.4) and (7.6) we have:











Recall that Si(ω) and Sr(ω) are transfer functions obtained from the differential equation
in (7.1) and are not real scalars for all ω. Thus Φ−1uu (i, r) has a non-constant phase
response.
(⇒) We will show that if i ∈ B is a corrupt node in GT , then there are at least two
neighbors of i in GU such that the corresponding entries in the inverse PSD have non-
constant transfer functions. By Assumption 2 on the location of corrupt nodes, every
corrupt node has at least two 1 hop neighbors in GT . By construction of perttubed
graph, GU , these nodes will also be neighbors of i in GU . Say these nodes are p, r. We
will now show that Φ−1uu (i, p), Φ
−1
uu (i, r) are non-constant transfer functions. Consider
Φ−1uu (i, p).
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1 . By (F.2), Ψ
−1

















Using (7.6) we have:











Recall that Si(ω) and Sp(ω) are transfer functions obtained from the differential equation
in (7.1) and are not real scalars for all ω. Therefore, by (F.8) and (F.9) we can see
that ∠Φ−1uu (i, p) is not a constant for all ω. The case for ∠Φ
−1
uu (i, r) being non-constant
can be shown similarly.
F.3 Proof of Theorem 11
Following the discussion in Section 7.3.2, the only result that needs to be proved is
Lemma 5, corresponding to the Placement of Corrupt Nodes.
Proof. Since {p, q, l, r, s} forms a clique in GU and GT is a tree, it follows that l is located
at the point of disconnection between p− q and r − s. What needs to be shown is the
correct alignment among the paths q−p− l− r− s, p− q− l− s− r and q−p− l− s− r
and p − q − l − r − s in GT . To this we will analyze the phase of inverse PSD entry
corresponding to pairs from {p, q} × {r, s} described in Proposition 5. Before that
we will need the following proposition that gives an expression for inverse PSD entry
corresponding to pairs from {p, q} × {r, s}.
Proposition 4. Suppose p− q− l− r− s holds in GT where l is a corrupt node. Then,
for any a ∈ {p, q} and b ∈ {r, s}, Φ−1uu (ω)(a, b) = Ψ−11 (ω)(a, b), where Ψ
−1
1 is defined by
(F.3) and v1 = l.
Proof. For k = 2, 3, . . . , n perturbed nodes we will inductively show that Ψ−1k (a, b) =
Ψ−11 (a, b).
We will require the following claim: for any vk being a perturbed node (k > 1), at
the most only one of a − vk or vk − b holds in GT . Note that there is already a path,
p− q− l− r− s, consisting of a and b. As vk 6= l and GT is a tree, existence of a−vk− b
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violates the assumption that GT is a tree. This proves the claim. In other words, at
least one of a − vk or vk − b does not hold in GT . Suppose vk − b does not hold true.
(The case a− vk can be shown similarly). Refer to this result as R1.
Consider k = 2. We will show that Ψ−12 (a, b) = Ψ
−1
1 (a, b). Using (F.3), Ψ
−1
2 (a, b) =






2 . We will show
that Γ2(a, b) = 0. Using (F.3), Ψ
−1
1 (v2, b) = Ψ
−1





1 . By (F.2), Ψ
−1
0 (v1, v2) =
Φ−1xx (v1,v2)
hv1hv2
. As v1 and v2 are at least
3-hops away in GT , using (7.6), Φ−1xx (v1, v2) = 0. Thus, Γ1(v2, v1) = 0. Invoking R1, we
have that v2 − b does not hold in GT . Then, v2 can either be a 2-hop neighbor of b in
GT or not.
Suppose v2 is a 2-hop neighbor of b. Then, v2 cannot be a 1-hop or 2-hop neighbor
of a because this leads to two paths connecting a and b: one through v2 and the other
being p−q−l−r−s, violating the condition that GT is a tree. Thus, v2 is neither a 1-hop
neighbor nor a 2-hop neighbor of a inGT . Thus, using (7.6) we have that Φ−1xx (a, v2) = 0.
By (F.2), Ψ−10 (a, v2) =
Φ−1xx (a,v2)
hahv2
. This implies Ψ−10 (a, v2) = 0. Therefore, Ψ
−1
1 (a, v2) =
0 and hence Γ2(a, b) = 0. Thus we have proved that Ψ
−1
2 (a, b) = Ψ
−1
1 (a, b).
Now consider that v2 is not a 2-hop neighbor of b. Then, using (7.6) we have that
Φ−1xx (v2, b) = 0. By (F.2), Ψ
−1
0 (v2, b) =
Φ−1xx (v2)
hv2hb
. This implies Ψ−10 (v2, b) = 0. Therefore,
Ψ−11 (v2, b) = 0 and hence Γ2(a, b) = 0. Thus we have proved that Ψ
−1
2 (a, b) = Ψ
−1
1 (a, b).
Now assume that the claim holds for some k > 2. That is, Ψ−1k (a, b) = Ψ
−1
1 (a, b). Us-
ing (F.3), Ψ−1k+1(a, b) = Ψ
−1
k (a, b)−Γk+1(a, b). As shown in Theorem 10, Ψ
−1
k (a, vk+1) =
Ψ−11 (a, vk+1) and Ψ
−1
k (vk+1, b) = Ψ
−1
1 (vk+1, b). Invoking R1, we have that vk+1− b does
not hold in GT . Then, vk+1 can either be a 2-hop neighbor of b in G
T or not.
Suppose vk+1 is a 2-hop neighbor of b. Similar to argument for v2, vk+1 cannot be
a 1-hop or 2-hop neighbor of a. As v1 and vk+1 are at least 3-hops away in G
T , using
(7.6), Φ−1xx (v1, vk+1) = 0. Now consider that vk+1 is not a 2-hop neighbor of b. Similar
to argument for v2, Ψ
−1
1 (vk+1, b) = 0 and hence Ψ
−1
k (vk+1, b) = 0 and Γk+1(a, b) = 0.
Thus we have proved that Ψ−1k+1(a, b) = Ψ
−1
1 (a, b).
Our next result, Proposition 5, analyzes the phase values of enteries in Φ−1uu .
Proposition 5. If p− q− l− r− s holds in GT , then ∠Φ−1uu (ω)(p, s) is a constant while
∠Φ−1uu (ω)(p, r), ∠Φ
−1
uu (ω)(q, s) and ∠Φ
−1
uu (ω)(q, r) are non-constant for all ω ∈ (−π, π].
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Proof. Using Proposition 4 we have that for any a ∈ {p, q} and b ∈ {r, s}, Φ−1uu (ω)(a, b) =
Ψ−11 (ω)(a, b), where Ψ
−1
1 is defined by (F.3) and v1 = l.
As v1 = l is the only corrupt node, Φ
−1
uu (ω)(a, b) can be expressed as:









Moreover, as a, b are not corrupt nodes, we have that ha(ω) = hb(ω) = 1. Thus,
Ψ−10 (a, l) = Φ
−1
xx (a, l) and Ψ
−1
0 (l, b) = Φ
−1
xx (l, b). Now we will show that the term ∆
−1
v1 is




0 (v1, v1). By (F.2) we have that Ψ
−1
0 (v1, v1) =
Φ−1xx (v1,v1)
|hl(ω)|2
. Using (7.6), we have that Φ−1xx (v1, v1) is real valued and therefore, Ψ
−1
0 (v1, v1)
is real valued. As θ(ω) is the PSD of autocorrelation of a WSS process it will be real
and non-negative valued. (A more formal description is in Chapter 2). Thus, ∆−1v1 is
real valued for all ω ∈ (−π, π].
We now proceed to evaluating ∠Φ−1uu (ω)(a, b) for all combinations of a ∈ {p, q} and
b ∈ {r, s}.
(q, r): In this case q, r are 1-hop neighbors of l in GT and hence as discussed in
Theorem 10, Ψ−10 (q, l) and Ψ
−1
0 (l, r) will be non-constant transfer functions. Thus,
Φ−1uu (q, r)(ω) will be non-constant transfer functions.
(p, r): Here, s is a 1-hop neighbor of l in GT . Thus as discussed in Theorem 10,
Ψ−10 (l, s) will be non-constant transfer function. Thus, Φ
−1
uu (p, r)(ω) will be a non-
constant transfer function. The case (q, s) can be shown similarly where r is a 1-hop
neighbor of l in GT ..
(p, s): As p, s are 2-hop neighbors of l in GT . Then, by (7.6) we have that Φ−1xx (p, l)
and Φ−1xx (l, s) being real valued. Thus, Ψ
−1
0 (p, l) and Ψ
−1
0 (l, s) will be real valued trans-
fer functions. As p, s are 4 hop neighbors, using (7.6) Φ−1xx (p, s) = 0. This implies
Ψ−10 (p, s) = 0. Then, Φ
−1




l . We have Ψ
−1
0 (p, l),
Ψ−10 (l, s) and ∆
−1
l being real valued. Thus, Φ
−1
uu (p, s)(ω) will be a real valued transfer
functions. Therefore, ∠Φ−1uu (p, s)(ω) will be a constant for all ω ∈ (−π, π].
It follows from above proposition that only if the corresponding phase properties
hold in p − q − l − r − s, then it is the only correct alignment as any other alignment
will have non-2 hop neighbors as 4 hops away and hence will violate the constant phase
argument. This verifies Lemma 5 and hence, Theorem 11 .
